


studio
art magazine

texts, abstracts, excerpts



Front and back covers: Avi Dayan, Jocko Arkin, 1975

Editor in Chief, Yael Bergstein

4

STUDIO 151 / MARCH 2004 / *Delirium Hallucination*

19

STUDIO 152 / MAY-JUNE 2004 / *Flash*

29

STUDIO 154 / JULY-AUGUST 2004 / *After Nature*

33

STUDIO 159 / MARCH-APRIL 2005

45

STUDIO 162 / OCTOBER- NOVEMBER 2005

50

STUDIO 164 / APRIL-MAY 2006 / *Special Architecture Issue / Israeli Architecture, 1970s-1980s*

53

STUDIO 165 / JUNE-JULY 2006

54

STUDIO 166 / AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 2006 / *Art and Theology*

55

STUDIO 167 / NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2006

58

STUDIO 168 / FEBRUARY-MARCH 2007

80

STUDIO 170 / AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 2007 / *Special Photography Issue / Smoke in Your Eyes*

TROMPE L'OEIL

On Mati Klarwein's Healthy Lie

Ory Dessau

Studio Art Magazine no. 151, March 2004 (Excerpt)

Mati Klarwein shot to international fame after his paintings were chosen to adorn two of Miles Davis's album covers, "Live/Evil" and "Bitches Brew." The collagist vision introduced by these covers, the possible outlet implied by their marketing function, imitated Davis's musical experiments at the time – the late 1960s and early 1970s – when he produced monkey sounds by electrifying his trumpet and attaching a pick-up connected to an electric guitar effects to the mouthpiece. From a current perspective, the painterly mode scripted by the outcome of Klarwein's painting does not necessarily indicate its historical classification under the signifier "psychedelic"; rather, it is an ostentatious, lavish proposal for an ecstatic stasis of the gaze, for altruistic narcissism. Klarwein's painting is entwined with the capitalist logic of production which condemns to denial the work invested in its products; it is not interested in extracting its *modi operandi* yet these are inevitably surrendered, thus reinforcing the squeamish aspect of his images that ostensibly represent permissiveness and sensuality. It would be wrong, however, to disregard the active participation of the outcome of Klarwein's painting in the historical processes of formulating the "psychedelic" signifier in American popular culture – a formulation epitomized in blurring the histories of the channels of liberation outlined by this very signifier in terms of a manifestation that represses the struggle to obtain its conditions.

The visible layer of iconography in Klarwein's paintings is readily decipherable, and yet clearly subversive. His account of the annunciation to a nude black Virgin Mary of the approaching birth of the Messiah (Santana's album cover) may attest to the directions of his defiance. The scenes in the paintings preserve the perversity, which remains fully potent, mainly after peeling the guise of industrious. albeit

smug and indifferent tolerance that engulfs Klarwein's oeuvre as a representative of the hippie spirit that purported to eliminate human differences by consecrating variation and sanctifying difference. The interest one may find in it today will naturally bear the tragedy of the failure of the 1960s revolution, the tragedy of liberation in its repressive sense.

Mati Klarwein grew up in Israel. In 1948, at the age of sixteen, he arrived in Paris, where he studied with Fernand Léger. His father, architect Joseph Klarwein, is registered as the designer of the Israeli Parliament (Knesset) house and government complex, although in actuality, he was distanced from the decision-making process concerning the House's location and final design, and his original plan, unanimously selected by the jury for the public competition for the planning of a permanent Knesset building, was unrecognizably revised. In some respects, one may direct the arguments used to deny Klarwein Senior the right to determine the final character of the Knesset building, arguments that branded his plan as an anti-modern reaction, a neo-classical anomaly, at Klarwein Junior as well.

HYPERMENTAL

Yael Bergstein talks with Bice Curiger

Studio Art Magazine no. 151, March 2004

B.C. Perhaps I should start by talking about how I got to the idea of 'Hypermental.' I'm a curator whose starting point is a strong relation to contemporary art, but I also work in a museum (Kunsthaus Zürich) which has in its collection art from the past 500 years, so I am placed in the privileged situation of being able to show contemporary art within a certain historic outlook. I also have a very large public when I show contemporary art, and that's why I come up with thematic shows. For the exhibition 'Hypermental' I could have chosen a title such as 'Problems of representation in post-war art', or a subtitle such as 'Traditions of surrealist moments after 1950.' These, of course, are not exhibition titles, and I also like to choose titles that don't start with the history of art but immediately hint at or refer to everyday experience. So Hypermental is a made-up word, but it shows you immediately that it is about an imaginary world which is somehow located in our body and is linked to reality. And, of course, 'hyper' hints at something exaggerated, tricky, which brings you to the fact that there is no security.

At the time, many positions in contemporary art dealt with the fact that we have developed a relationship to the real that is very immaterial and fictional. This has to do with our being so connected to all those highly refined new media, and the capability of switching from the virtual and fictional to reality. That was the starting point. In addition, I perceived signals in today's artwork that made me go back to the history of art. I thought, for instance, about the legacy of Surrealism, and saw that there are two artists who dealt very early with the strong influence of photography on mass media and our relation to reality. I thought of Max Ernst with his early collages, who cut up and refigured images in a surrealist way that was very important to what was done later on. I thought of Dalí, with his paranoid-critical approach, and of

his works, especially from the 1950s on, in which he introduced raster dots. Max Ernst's works are not in the show, nor Warhol's, but these are the artists who led to Hypermental.

Y.B. I assume that at the time you made the exhibition it was not common to refer to Dalí as a central influence.

B.C. If artists talked about Dalí at all, it was the early Dalí. After the war he obviously made some terrible works, but I think that a work such as *Portrait of My Dead Brother* is a stunning work. I don't know if it refers to war or to a post-war situation. I only know that it refers to his dead brother. Apparently, before he was born there was another child with his name, and he died. Dalí was haunted by this nonexistent brother, nonexistent but existent.

Y.B. *Portrait of My Dead Brother* from 1963 is one of the most important works in the exhibition.

B.C. It is quite a big painting, and it was shown at the entrance to the exhibition. On its left side is an image of Millet's *The Angelus*, which was a very popular print in the nineteenth century. But here, if you go closer and you look at these raster dots, you can distinguish cherries above the figure's big mouth, you can see some soldiers with helmets in the sky, who look almost like Martians, and dots that seem like a scheme of atoms, and you even see a big black bird on the left side of his hand. What I think is important here is a kind of zoom-in into a reality, and a zoom-out into another one; a possible focus on micro- and macroscopic structures, and modern man's capability of zooming mentally into realities which were invisible before.

The new world offered new media and new techniques, offering a visibility which was not possible a hundred years before. And Dalí was the one who brought in the element of fever, of hysteria or paranoia, what we may call hallucination.

Y.B. These elements are manifested also in Fred Tomaselli's works.

B.C. Thinking about the relation between the works of Dalí and Tomaselli, it exists in the notion of a face which draws you into an eternal space. Tomaselli's works are composed of highly organized, very ordered little elements, which are somehow controlled by a magic hand, but at the same time you lose

contact with safe reality, which is usually connected with the idea of losing control. And I find this duality of control and losing control interesting.

About eight years ago, Peter Riebel (who wrote a text for the *Hypermental* catalogue) curated a painting show in Austria, where I first saw one of Tomaselli's pill works. Then I met Tomaselli himself, and he told me that he grew up in Los Angeles, not far from Disneyland, which fascinated me. It was also interesting for me to learn that he has Swiss roots (he comes from the same village where we print *Parkett*). The cliché about the Swiss is that they are clock makers who work with tweezers to magnify life into a little mechanical universe of miniature machines. There is something of this in his paintings. Tomaselli's paintings are the opposite of Jackson Pollock's idea of big gestures and drip painting. He places it all in order, while his works also have this will to an open universe and a painterly or structural connection to the ideal of 'all overness,' which I think still interests many American painters.

- Y.B. Can you elaborate on this idea of 'all overness' in his work?
- B.C. When Tomaselli introduces a figure, it seems that he turns to a more traditional feel or to the idea of figurative painting, but at the same time these figures are always rendered in sort of atoms. I am thinking about his *Adam and Eve, Us and Them*, or all the figures that are totally composed of elements. Even when they have twenty eyes instead of two, you feel like you are looking into the body, while the materiality of that body is connected, atom by atom, to the figure's outside. This is a kind of 'all overness,' where each little element in the painting is connected in high tension with the others.
- Y.B. Do you see a connection here to the notion of the cosmic which seems to appear in contemporary young art, like Matthew Ritchie's work?
- B.C. Yes, certainly. Many artists now deal with analogies to science, the image of science and its presence. As we know, science has also started to work with visual images, much more than in the past. But in Tomaselli's work, of course, there is a relationship between the idea of science and mysticism.
- Y.B. We can add the influence of psychedelic culture, the angle of low mysticism

in his works.

- B.C. Yes, absolutely. Obviously, when talking about the 'all overness' in Pollock's work I refer to art history, yet at the same time I see how much Tomaselli is doing a *tabula rasa*. If you think back, Pollock also tried to do a *tabula rasa*, to blow away European tradition. That was the part Clement Greenberg played. But his work was even more connected to genealogy, going back to Cézanne, cubism and so on. He tried to bring in the idea of a structural net that develops on the surface of a painting. In the 60s the first post-war generation appeared, which wanted to break away from the generation that went through WW2, to start again as a *tabula rasa*. There was a huge expansiveness in that era, not only sociologically and politically but also of the consciousness. They really wanted to reach other universes, to change and to be radical in as many ways as possible.
- Y.B. It seems that artists like Doug Aitken and Tomaselli also understand the impossibility or the limitedness of the wish for release that underlay the psychedelic practices of the 60s. That's why the hallucination in their works is only an effect.
- B.C. If I see a connection between Tomaselli and Aitken, it is that both try to deal with the idea of borderline. Doug Aitken's work is more about civilization and what happens then, if you just step over the border of civilization towards a space that is both interior and exterior, where you are alone (lonesomeness is too romantic in this context, I am looking for another word...). Tomaselli's works are also about borderlines of consciousness, but perhaps Aitken's are more about the borderline and Tomaselli's are really about the wish to open up.

But you were asking about the impossibility of the psychedelic effect. In this context, it is interesting to note Doug Aitken's work *Diamond Feed* (1996), which he filmed in Namibia. It's a video screening that creates a feeling of fever, like being in a very hot place and starting to hallucinate. It feels like a highly protected space, but at the same time it's a desert, an open space, and it's a very extreme, surreal image. Nothing dramatic is happening, only too much heat, an exceedingly high temperature. It's a kind of inner

mental situation, where everything seems quiet and O.K. but at the same time you know that something is in great danger, that it's an extreme state.

Referring to the effect issue, Doug Aitken sometimes shows an external image and yet you feel that it's a very different internal world, that there is high tension between what you see and what is inside. For instance, his work *Eraser* was filmed on an island where there was a volcano eruption. The people were evacuated from the island, and he went there and just crossed the island diagonally. In the video we see all the ashes, from which stems the name *Eraser*; something was erased, lives were erased, something extreme happened. Some people, very few, did not leave the island, so you see a light in a house. While you're watching the video, there isn't much to see. Mainly a dark, gray landscape. Of course, it is clear that the work is about an inner state.

In this work I see another analogy between Tomaselli and Aitken, which is that their work is highly formalized. Aitken didn't just go and place his camera in this or that corner and then cut it together. He had a very precise idea, it is all very controlled. He drew this diagonal in the landscape, and there he filmed. There is a strong will of form in Tomaselli and Aitken's works, a will to control what they say and show.

Y.B. There is also the 'dream machine' that Aitken deconstructs and reconstructs in *Into the Sun*.

B.C. In *Into the Sun* Aitken turns his gaze to Bollywood studios in India, the largest film studios in the world. He took still photos of this myth machine, and then fed the stills into a subtle sequence of video screening. It is a video installation composed of three projections on the fabric walls of a tent, which is similar to the ones in India, in the desert. You enter the tent through a curtain, stepping on red desert sand, like tennis-court sand. The sound is sometimes disconnected from the projected image, and so there are two different developments of space and of time; in image and in sound. The image itself also has an internal reverberation within itself: what's in it and how it was created.

The anthropological fact is that the films produced in Bollywood are

essentially important to the people who live there. Aitken picks up a place where fiction is produced and shows the actors who play in these films, and there is a certain borderline moment where the outside reality is in friction with the reality inside. It is the moment when people outside the studio realize that the actor is outside. It is a very dangerous moment because, as Doug told me, if one of the lead actors who play the roles of fairytale princes would go out to the street, it would cause hysteria. People would start jumping over each other, people would be wounded. These characters are so much part of the reality outside, the reality of Indian everyday life, but in such a tense way, because the fairytale world, this emotional projection field that they represent, has the potential to arouse immense anger and drama once it actually touches reality. I find this fascinating, and I think that this is exactly what Doug Aitken's work is about.

- Y.B. Another work created by Aitken which has a hallucinatory effect is the kite that he made for *Parkett*.
- B.C. Aitken created a kite which is a very strange object, perhaps stemming from his interest in Japanese paper-folding tradition. Two dimensions suddenly become, through folding, three-dimensional. This may also be seen as a reflection on the ability to add dimensions to things, in a metaphorical way. It is a mirror-kite, and he photographed it against the blue sky. In another photograph, there is a reflection of stars. It is, then, a dreamy picture of an object which reflects the world. Reflection is always about throwing reality back at you, but it also has an unreal aspect.
- Y.B. You recently curated an exhibition of Georgia O'Keefe's work in the Kunsthhaus in Zürich. Tomaselli's paintings continue the tradition of American phantasmagoric desert landscapes, in which O'Keefe was a seminal figure. O'Keefe is also important in the context of Aitken's universal hallucinatory landscapes.
- B.C. I mentioned the *tabula rasa* in Tomaselli's paintings before, and the sort of borderline in Aitken's work; I think one could look at O'Keefe's work from this aspect too. I thought of this exhibition when I curated the exhibition "Birth of the Cool" in 1997, on American painting from Georgia O'Keefe

to Christopher Wool. This was not the usual tale of art history, in which American modern art starts with Jackson Pollock and is all about abstraction, a tale in which art after WW2 equals abstract art. I wanted to show painting which does not fetishize the idea of abstraction but enables us to look at an image which becomes flat while it is also ambivalent. That is, you can look at it as an image, but at the same time you see a flat image, forms on a surface. That's how I looked at O'Keefe's work which, like Dalí's, is always connected to some clichés because of all the posters and postcards, and her biography is a big hit, because she was with Alfred Steiglitz and all that... It was a bit of a challenge for me to look at her work in a fresh way, and I think that as a European it is probably easier for me to do this than for an American, because she is so much a missing part of American art.

I was interested, for example, in taking apart the idea that her first works were abstract. Art historians found it difficult to deal with her later works, saying that she couldn't choose between abstraction and figuration. For me, her early abstractions were never really abstractions. She was always dealing with a sort of figuration, and her starting point was to a great extent her own body and her life experience, the space she was living in. At the same time, she didn't really draw the human figure. If you want to draw a connection between O'Keefe and Tomaselli and Aitken, we can see that there are a lot of symmetries in her abstractions, as there are in the body, and this is very important in her early paintings. This takes me back to the idea of *tabula rasa*, because O'Keefe wasn't interested in going back to European tradition, but wanted to look at her own experience, to feel identical with herself.

I think that going to the desert was extremely important for her at a certain moment. And what is the desert? In the desert, you feel like you are shrinking as you face dimensions that are so much bigger than you. She was deeply impressed by her experience in the desert. Talking about American art and the European tradition, I think that O'Keefe's message was the opposite of the Renaissance notion of the human being as the center of the universe. She wanted to get rid of that idea, and I think this was a very early postmodern idea. This was different from Kandinsky or Malevich, who

turned to abstraction and made works of art which were a reality that had nothing to do with everyday experience. Her art was always very connected to life experience, it was not a thing in itself. So I think there is not really a contradiction between her late works and her so-called abstractions, which actually dealt a lot with her body, with what she saw and with her perceptions.

It is also interesting to note how early she started to introduce photographic optics into paintings. She has early paintings of sky-scrapers which look like wide-lens photos. But her way of dealing with these photos was different than her male colleagues, such as Egon Schiele or the Neue Sachlichkeit artists, painters who wanted to emphasize the plasticity of the photographic rendering of the image. She created an image that was very flat, but was also, at the same time, highly stylized. Flowers, for instance, which at the time were an intimate motif in the Still Life genre, usually in small format – she made them big and loud. She made this kind of close-up image, almost in a billboard technique. I think that introducing this highly communicative image into art, almost like Pop Art, was very important. She really wanted to communicate with the viewer.

This is also extremely accentuated in the art of Aitken and Tomaselli. Tomaselli cuts out images from the media, using them like *prima materia*, as an alchemist uses earth, fire and water. He pastes the images together and creates something new. Aitken is also interesting in relation to media, as he is one of the first artists who introduced a very professionalized, hi-tech use of video. He is not a video artist whose work is low-tech like a *bricoleur*; he's done productions that are quite like the ones in the music industry, using the most advanced technology. And while O'Keefe related to the cosmic elements in reality, she was also aware that life was about to change, changing the way we perceive the world.

IMPERIALITY

On The works of Bill Viola, Gil Shani, and Moshe Ninio Following ArtFocus 4, International Biennial of Contemporary Art, Jerusalem Shva Salhoov in Conversation with Yael Bergstein

Studio Art Magazine no. 151, March 2004 (Excerpts)

ArtFocus 4 accentuated the fact that we belong to the western apocalyptic agenda, that we are wholly its subjects. Thus, the question arises of how Jewish art is created; the question of the place and lack of place for Jewish art that forcefully emerged within the imperial context of the Museum of Underground Prisoners.

The way in which the artistic narrative was interwoven with the place profoundly exposes, to my mind, the impossibility of Jewish art to exist and subsist in a public sphere. Its occurrence is tantamount to an event. This impossibility is revealed haphazardly. Vis-à-vis Bill Viola's video piece *Observance*, it becomes clear.

The work is constructed like a mass. Viola wholly embraces the iconic moment of communion. It exposes once again the structure of the salvation ritual as a wandering event that may take place anywhere. Willingly or unwillingly, you join in an imperial, entirely Christian procedure. In no Jewish ritual is there such a focal moment. The anticipation of redemption has been entirely assimilated into the individuals' realms of mysticism. These are rituals of redemption that have neither definite form nor specific structure. They are a gaze into time itself, into the invisible future that is concealed within and without all temporal signs. This point is further elaborated in my discussion of Moshe Ninio's piece *Exodus*.

Another dimension concerning the realization of the infinite randomness of the iconic formations subordinate to the canonical standard is revealed in Gil Shani's work, *Judaica Collection: Birds and Shofars* [Blowing Horns]. This randomness of form is the possibility of Jewish art. Eliminated in the interstice between the canonical structure and its realization are the infinite possibilities of anti-forms,

forms of, mercurial twilight forms, from which and in which the myth intrinsic to the very structure of Jewish existence – the myth of redemption – submerges and emerges. It occurs under sudden field condition, in conjectured ways.

This splinter-like quality generates an immense space of freedom and otherness regarding Judaism in its classical senses. Gil Shani, for instance, transforms the forbidden into an object of the gaze, installing an ensemble of birds protected by their impurity. All that they are allowed to do in this world is fulfill the function of beauty. This affinity between beauty and impurity is fundamental and highly significant. It indicates that beauty is not an object, it is a dynamics; a constant dialectical dynamics of powerful approach and retreat. This restrained motion highlights something palpable within the canonical. The moment of impurity is an instance of empowerment devoid of the majesty of sanctity.

The motion is revealed through the Jewish metaphor within which the work was installed; a metaphor that allows for an encounter, through imagination and the canonical symbol, with the utterly internal locus where you are one with the desire realized in otherness. This encounter transpires as the canonical locus of Judaism and purity alike. It is a suggestion that enables a revelation of beauty which is, for me, the most profound feature of the Jewish canon: the duality and mystery of norm. The emergence of norm as beauty, as sublime, as a duality of impurity and purity, occurs in art through a formative absence of structure; an absence that enables an interstice of freedom.

THE TERRIBLE GENRE

On the Infinite Reflections of the Remembrance Industry

Zvi Elhyani

Studio Art Magazine no. 151, March 2004 (Abstract)

Architect Moshe Safdie's plan for the redesign and expansion of Yad Vashem Holocaust Museum in Jerusalem was selected in 1997. His current renovation project at Yad Vashem elicits thoughts about his first job on the site, the Children's Holocaust Memorial which was commissioned in 1976. Safdie opted for a conceptual approach, proposing the new Memorial as an exhibit-free experience of cessation and communion. The objective, reflection (in the sense of meditation), was instrumentally translated into reflection (in the sense of mirroring); infinite reflections of the memorial candle flame. The criticism directed at this installation focused mainly on the visual manipulation harnessed to the remembrance industry. Others were actually impressed by the overall tear-inspiring effect. Either way, the Children's Holocaust Memorial set a new standard in the culture of memorialization in general, and in Israel in particular.

Safdie at Yad Vashem is a case of sensory-architectural manipulation. His work at Yad Vashem in the past two decades has robbed the site of any mourning or sorrow. The colossal dimensions of the new structures and the all-too-excellent concrete work render the Tent of Remembrance – Yad Vashem's main structure and the epitome of restrained commemorative architecture, designed by Arie Elhanani in the mid-50s – redundant, even before the project is finished. The Yad Vashem site is becoming a clenched fist of fundamentalism, at a place that previously, before the decline, strove to warn against it. One minute before the Holocaust turns into a truly elusive memory, with no living proof whatsoever, and in view of the growing denial, the commemorative expression of the Holocaust must be committed to banal historicity and intensive documentation and research enterprises, rather than to metaphysical architectural spectacles.

*THE NEXT DOCUMENTA WILL NOT BE
CURATED BY AN ARTIST*

*Tal Sterngast in Conversation with Roger M. Buergel, Artistic
Director of Documenta XII, Kassel 2007*

Studio Art Magazine no. 151, March 2004 (Excerpt)

R.B. I am still in the early stages of work. I spend long hours at the Documenta archives learning what the first shows looked like. For me, the beginning of the Documenta is a very interesting gesture. Kassel was a battlefield, it was erased; the project of German culture and bourgeoisie went bankrupt and was totally corrupted. Conceiving of an event of contemporary art in the midst of a frontal confrontation with negativity in its purest form – in the philosophical sense as well: the emptying of meaning which is modernism's quintessential quality – this is something very unique, which I admire, regardless of how conscious they were of it at the time. It is part of the value and distinction of the Documenta, and this is what makes it unique in the context of the big shows as well. It is underlain by true intention to take responsibility for a total, in some respects inexplicable, cultural rift, and this is still relevant. Arnold Bode, in Documenta I and II, did not try to conceal the fact that the Fridericianum building where it was shown was still a ruin. Our modernist past is also a ruin, the ruins of the great destruction of the 20th century.

T.S. Romanticism also uses ruins.

R.B. Perhaps there is indeed an affinity between the fetishism of ruins in romantic images and the ruins of real destruction.

T.S. You say you are a progressive romantic. What do you mean by that?

R.B. The tradition of German Romanticism is quite ambivalent. It has the two poles, the progressive and the reactionary; perhaps the one cannot exist without the other. I don't want to sound too theological, it is more of a poetic argument – things in the universe are interrelated. Not only the solar system

and the greenhouse effect and all the interdependencies between planets; the universe of artistic forms is also limited, and things must refer to one another in terms of coloration, form, etc. This semblance may be used in exhibitions by linking divergent artworks that have no natural, logical or historical connection. Such a move, that enables you to initiate connections and relationships, also influences you as a subject. It gives you a certain power and satisfaction that you are the one making these connections and understanding the logic of phenomena. Obviously in aesthetic terms, this “logic” is not really logical, because logic in artworks is always fluid, improvised, random; it always falls apart.

FLASH MOB

Barry Frydlander, Together, For a Moment

Moshe Ninio

Studio Art Magazine no. 152, May-June 2004 (Excerpt)

Vulnerability of one who is on the verge of being crashed is a sentiment that emerges from Barry Frydlander's photographs from the 1980s, years in which he operated as a wandering photographer in the no-man's-land of urban common spaces. His off-the-cuff snapshots displayed persistent alertness to defenselessness. The figures' photographs, albeit incidental, were the product of a quintessential photographic ceremonial contract, perpetuating the requirements of two parties as a tacit agreement: the signifying photographer, emerging from the darkness, illuminates himself with the light reflected by the hunted-signified.

The flash – an aggressive, invasive, dazzling light that in a single gesture fuses the characteristics of a crime scene photograph with a touch of momentary glamour – served Frydlander to highlight the tension between a swift, ephemeral visibility and the theater of human pretense: the charade entailed in the ascription of attributes of self-worth. The photographic emulsion was simultaneously exposed to two different light intensities, whose partial overlapping generates an image with an interrupted spatial continuum. Thus, a hierarchy of visibility was created in the resulting image between the photograph's focal point and that which remains in its margins, and the figures often seem to be about to evaporate. A hint of the subject was still there, on both sides of the camera – but its status was already being questioned.

In 1994, after a five-year break from photography, Frydlander began creating digital mosaic pictures, albeit still based on existing pools of negatives. This may be depicted as a fundamental transition from an image-photograph that retains an implicit model of 'revelation' to an image-tableau generated by a 'rationale of selection': acceptance of an array of (social, economic) conventions and practices

encrypted within the application itself, and encoded control over a database that functions as a 'universe.'

The latency period that preceded the new mode of image-production corresponds with the first Intifada (1988-1993) – a first-of-a-kind post-modern popular uprising: an action on the symbolic level that structures the heroics of a popular revolt via the production of images for the media. Through acts of 'cut-and-paste,' Frydender (aware of the loss of faith in photographic factuality) presents a fabrication of an image *in situ* (a 'photo opportunity' as collaboration between ad-hoc 'rebels' and foreign photojournalists who commission-fabricate an 'event'): imaging under Third-World like conditions, where the sole image-commodity on offer, already always, is violence as an image.

NAKED TERROR: ON PAINTING AND BIOPOLITICS

“Francis Bacon and the Tradition of Art,” Fondation Beyeler, Basel

Zvi Szir

Studio Art Magazine no. 152, May-June 2004 (Excerpt)

“Francis Bacon and the Tradition of Art,” a joint exhibition by Fondation Beyeler, Basel, and the Vienna Museum of Modern Art, is a fitting display for a painter who has become a trademark, who has been formulated by art, at least young British art, as a genetic code, engendering a *modus operandi* that places exposed flesh in the spotlight. In *Study After Velasquez' Portrait of Pope Innocent X*, power and the victim are intermingled; likewise, the boundary between the political entity and the person is breached, and a more fundamental, new state appears: naked terror. Naked life is exposed in all its fragility when the representations of the centers of power and the hierarchies of these representations – the form that endows life with a protective framework – are destabilized, and life is left naked in the center of Bacon's works. When people are deprived of socio-political existence (rights as well as duties), life as form dissolves, and human existence is reduced to the mere fact of being alive.

The relationship between 'naked life' and 'form-of-life' is a central axis in Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben's political ontology, which may afford a more precise observation of Bacon's work. Form-of-life, in which our expression as political subjects merges with our natural existence, is externalized in Bacon's work in the relationship between face and mien. The portrait appears as the arena of a struggle between one's external appearance, the face as expression, and the unrestrained urge to become a formless steak. The face, the site where life becomes language, absolute communicability, struggles to mold flesh itself, existence that has been reduced to life/death. Despite the vigorous brushstrokes in the works created by Bacon in the 1960s, it is difficult to refer to motion or gesture. Thus, suspended existence or halted life associates Bacon with Edward Muybridge.

If we believe Bacon's painting and Agamben's thinking, then between the 'end of mankind' and the Superman we must become accustomed to considering ourselves as the excluded person or the refugee, the *Homo Sacer*, the sacred man specified by ancient Roman law as one whose killing does not constitute a crime and yet cannot be sacrificed since his life is worthless. His sanctity is that of a person whose body and life have been forsaken, and only God can help him.

STREET WORK VERSUS GLOBAL NAVIGATION SYSTEM

Different Modes of Presenting Public Space (Paris)

Sylvaine Bulle

Studio Art Magazine no. 152, May-June 2004 (Excerpt)

The text addresses two modes of presenting public space and contemporary worlds in recent exhibitions in Europe. More and more exhibitions in Europe wish to map out the world, but as seen from afar or from above. They adopt the geographic, geo-political and spatial metaphors of the map, the diagram, the camp, without truly commenting on the social and urban facts that they pretend to observe (globalization, wars, non-citizenship). On the other hand, work such as Philip-Lorca diCorcia's, recently exhibited in Paris, genuinely tackles the cities, modes of living, conditions of urban life, through aesthetic and poetic narration. He does not play with cartographic references or geographic localizations, but rather with variations of scale, of bodies, of apartments in the street, in order to show a human condition. His work justifies the notion that it is in the articulation of scales, of gazes, of places, in the contact zone between images more than in the 'object of discourse' or in the accumulation of signs, that one can better perceive contemporary phenomena.

THE B-LANGUAGE

*On a soon-to-be-published translation of Andy Warhol's book
The Philosophy of Andy Warhol (From A to B
and Back Again)*

Ory Dessau

Studio Art Magazine no.152, May-June 2004

A Hebrew translation of Andy Warhol's fifth book, *The Philosophy of Andy Warhol (From A to B and Back Again)*, is soon to be published by Babel, 29 years after its English publication. This is an important event that raises not only crucial questions about problems of translation and translation into Hebrew, as well as about Warhol's translatability in general.

In anticipation of the translation let us return to Warhol's original version and identify the changes made in the Hebrewization of Warhol's language as an expansion of an expansion of a text arranged as an autarkical economy, whose secondary growths and contractions are constant and internal: from A to B and back again. Thus a Hebrew Warhol seems unlikely, piratical, entailing illegal construction.

All of Warhol's 14 books may be referred to as "ghost literature," or literature which is erased. These books were not really written, but rather taped, dictated and erased. Their very publication implies their erasure: "My mind is a tape-recorder with only one button: erase" (p. 40). Warhol is his own ghost writer. "A written communication from Andy was a rarity," notes Pat Hackett, who edited his books and even co-signed one of them (*POPism*), in the introduction to his Diaries. The fact that reproduction is the material point of departure of books, a called-for indication where Warhol's books are concerned, is not enough to facilitate Warhol's reproduction into Hebrew or to anchor the spectral presence of the Warholesque text, whose origin is reconstruction and translation to begin with. The anticipated publication of the Hebrew translation undermines the hermetic

cooperative framework maintained by the Warholesque text: an epidermal frame in which the differences between origin and translation, anterior and posterior, transmission and reception, linearity and simultaneity, are eliminated. Hebrew will create Warhol as an author, while he is, in fact, a narrator who dictates, exculpating himself to himself.

I would like to suggest that the book should be translated phonetically (or disseminated on tape). Warhol's conclusion from his serious injury when shot by Valerie Solanis – "If someone else talks about it, I listen, I hear the words, and I think, maybe it's all true" – will thus be transliterated in Hebrew letters: "איף סמוואן, אילס טוקס אבאוט איט, איי ליסן, איי היר ד'ה וורדס, אנד איי תינק, מייבי איטס אול טרו"; or else written in Hebrew transliterated in Latin alphabet: *Im mishehu aher medaber al ze, ani makshiv, ani shome'a et hamilim, ve'ani hoshev, ulai hacol nahon*. Focusing for a moment on the poetic-rhetoric procedure encapsulated in this statement, regardless of its place in the sequence of conversations held between A and B in the book, it would seem that in its striving for general-methodical patterns it is similar to Aharon Shabtai's poem in his book *First Lecture*: "Walking / Is standing / Which is sitting / Which is lying down." But unlike Shabtai, who formulates a wild course of life in which there is no language and no disruptions, Warhol's "I listen" precedes his "I hear the words" – that is, passive, inevitable attention is the response to the other's voice, which carries the communication of your death and resurrection (Warhol's fatal injury and his recovery) as an meaningless mumble, which only later is separated into words and becomes discourse about truths ("maybe it's all true"; *ulai hacol nahon*).

Warhol's literary work should be seen as one of the most radical experiments of the 1960s onwards, inquiring into the relation between literature and technology, and clarifying the changing stance of the author vis-à-vis the act of writing and other procedures of documentation. Warhol's obsessive use of recording mechanisms, his many recordings, the "time capsules," create a hierarchy in which technology takes on the role of literature – to reflect the last moments before death (confirmed in 9/11, when victims left messages on their relatives' answering machines and computers, knowing these were their last words). The lack of involvement conceptualized by Warhol through his avoidance of writing involves his disappearance, removing

himself in order to be reunited with the recording device, which he often used: "I didn't get married until 1964, when I got my first tape-recorder. My wife. My tape recorder and I have been married for ten years now. When I say we I mean my tape recorder and me. A lot of people don't understand that."

The process of producing Warhol's books started off in 1964 in recording and transcription, often simultaneously; what is written is what is transcribed according to what is recorded. The linkage and distinction between Warhol-tape and Warhol-wife, duos that replicate gender divisions and contractual unions, turn Warhol into an empty slate of sorts, a blind focal point on which the world is recorded: "People should fall in love with their eyes closed. Just close your eyes. Don't look."

Andy Warhol is both the subject and the object of his philosophy book, addresser and addressee, negation and its negation, possibility and experimentation, continuity and fragmentariness. The book poses as a celebrity how-to book ("Try the Andy Warhol New York City Diet: when I order in a restaurant, I order everything that I don't want"), and also as a writer's collected writings ("My favorite piece of sculpture will be a solid wall with a hole in it to frame the space on the other side"). This tactic of multiple possible genre classifications actually reinforces the book's materiality. The book sums up several interviews he had with Pat Hackett, and some taped conversations with Bob Colacello and Ingrid Berlin. The letter A in the book's subtitle – which signifies endless movement, from A to B and back again – is the first initial of his first name, as well as signifying the beginning. In the talks between A and B, the letter A, which stands for Warhol, is split off into an I, while the letter B signifies other splits: it is the unknown, representing either Hackett or Colacello or Berlin. B is splitting-up personified, it is the B-language, the language of bisexuals. A is both a singular sign and a sign of disgrace. (Identified as A, Warhol is associated with Nathaniel Hawthorne's Hester Prynne and the scarlet letter she had to wear for deviating from social norms – a gender reversal which is yet another replication: an image of Hester Prynne and her infant daughter, which Hawthorne depicted as bringing to mind an image of divine motherhood.)

Warhol's books consist of "sound portraits," a term coined by his friend Victor Bockris to denote both the books and the role of the portrait in Warhol's oeuvre. His first book, *a (a novel)*, is in fact a transcript of a recorded day, 24 hours in

the life of Ondine, one of the most talkative members of the Factory. Warhol, who according to Bockris was well aware of Joyce's *Ulysses*, strove to overcome physical limitations and stay awake for a whole day, but got tired after 12 straight hours and the second half of the day was postponed for a couple of years, only completed in 1966 (the year of Warhol's film *The Loves of Ondine*, with the latter as protagonist), as if intentionally exposing homogenous time as a fabrication, demonstrating discontinuity of time and duration. The tapes were divided among several transcribers, some directly associated with the people on tape, some who had other reservations, and their emotional involvement resulted in interventions in the text and even in losing parts of it. Maureen Tucker, for instance, the Velvet Underground drummer, who was in charge of some of the typing, would not type curse words, replacing them with white spaces; the speaker's words robbed.

The transparent procedure outlined by Warhol's text recharges with meaning the implications of translation – from speech to writing and back again, from speaker to text and back again, from synchronic time to diachronic and back again (from space to time, from time to space). The readers are deemed qualified to function as recording devices and archives of erasure, while also being condemned to playing taped performances of quotes and quotes-of-quotes, now in Hebrew dubbing.

SEMINAR FOR PALESTINIAN LITERATURE AND ART

Shaul Setter

Studio Art Magazine no. 152, May-June 2004 (Excerpt)

At the Seminar for Palestinian Literature and Art held at Ma'ale Hachamisha in March 2004, Suleiman Mansour sketched a bleak picture: there is not even a single school of art in the entire West Bank; the art centers established in Gaza, Jerusalem and Ramallah in the 1970s are now being shut down, one by one; Mansour's own paintings have recently been paint-sprayed by Israeli soldiers. The first exhibition dedicated to Palestinian art in the United States was staged only a year ago, at the Art Car Museum in Texas.

At a time when the museum space is so blatantly criticized as a defining site for artworks, Palestinian art has no museum whatsoever. Should it now seek a museum, along with national independence, only for these future achievements to put it in a position of clear disadvantage in comparison with the non-museal art and post-national society of the West?

Palestinian art, like any political art, is required to create its modes of expression each time anew, vis-à-vis the tension between different types of engagement. For many years, Palestinians were not allowed to present works painted in the colors of their flag, by order of the military regime. Censorship does not settle for prohibition on the contents of art; it also demands to restrict its tools and means. Expansion of these means is, thus, a form of resistance.

A NOTE ON NEO-HISTORICISM

On the Return to Historical Art as a Symptom

Zvi Szir

Studio Art Magazine no. 154, July-August 2004 (Excerpt)

Ever since protests began to be heard against the war in Iraq, the previous century's pockets of resistance seem to have become more relevant than ever. The gaze cast upon them is disillusioned, split, yearning and rejecting at one and the same time, recognizing their dreamy-nightmarish existence, but nonetheless favorable. The powerful Muntean/Rosenblum exhibition that opened at the Tate Britain, London in April ("It is Never Facts that Tell") accurately formulates the ambivalent attitude toward these yearnings.

In view of the flood of works based, for the most part, on mimetic processes and on a return to historical scenes and events, or to a certain type of documentarism (Sam Durant, Zak Smith, Jeremy Blake, Sam Green & Bill Siegel, Barnaby Furnas, Fernando Bryce), one is reminded of the great moments of historical painting at the turn of the 18th century – a moment when an exhausted language became channeled into synthetic associations and academic syntaxes, applying all its representation, expression, and presentation apparatuses to the recent past.

The renewed interest in Smithson as an artist and a theoretician exposes the problematics of neo-historicism. The temporal issue being one of his search axes, Smithson was highly conscious of the problematic nature of the historical; the dialectic oscillation of his work between the ephemeral-fragile and the cosmic-geological time challenges the ordering of art as "art history."

This phenomenon may be understood by turning the gaze to the field in-between language and things. The gap between word and things, preserved and generated by the pair signifier/signified, has been systematically uncovered and thought in the last third of the 20th century as a constant movement, a wild growth, a flux of meanings and interrelations between signifiers and the worlds to which

they refer. These observations, however, have omitted dead languages: Yiddish, Latin, Apache – languages whose world abandoned them, languages that have remained as signifiers without signifieds.

The state of consciousness that underlay “Late Capitalism” has come to an end or, in the very least, underwent such a radical transformation in recent years, that the language that had previously constituted/described it has become devoid of signifieds. We are thus left with an array of signifiers (in the artistic, political, philosophical, as well as everyday languages) that can only point at an outdated, spectral reality. Concurrently, a reality that has not yet been constituted as a language takes place. We were left with superfluous words, with a language that no longer constitutes a world, a language that has been abandoned by the things. That is when art must look back – not because the new is not possible, but because it is “not yet.”

AN INTERVIEW WITH ARIELLA AZOULAY

*On the exhibition "Everything Could Be Seen"
at the Um El Fahem Art Gallery*

Joshua Simon

Studio Art Magazine no. 154, July-August 2004 (Excerpt)

Ariella Azoulay curated the exhibition "Everything Could Be Seen" at the Um El Fahem Art Gallery (re-opened in a new space in March 2004, and directed by Said Abu-Shakra). In continuation of her scholarly explorations of the concept of citizenship, Azoulay writes in the catalogue: "The exhibition presents a series of images that have been conceived, collected, classified, created or processed out of the continuing everyday reality of the State of Israel's 'temporary' suzerainty over three-and-a-half million Palestinians."

- J. S. You call the exhibition "Everything Could Be Seen," and these days we commemorate the fifteenth anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre – where everything could be seen, broadcast live, but it made no real difference.
- A. A. There is no naive belief here that if everything is seen, the wrongdoing would cease. The gaze is not omnipotent. But the conclusion that the gaze is limited and conditioned does not eliminate the important role it plays in producing the horror, a role that is, at times, crucial. In the exhibition I ask how come the Israeli victimization of the Palestinian population is visible, practically on the surface, and yet people fail to see it? The conditions of the gaze in general, and in Israel in particular, are highly corrupt. On the one hand, horror has been transformed into a commodity as part of the process of globalization; on the other – the ongoing Occupation has persistently corrupted both the field of vision and the civil apparatuses.
- J. S. The essay in the exhibition catalogue is provocative, to my mind, because of the notion of responsibility arising from the text. At the conclusion you

write: “The apparently politically correct demand that the Palestinians’ struggle be managed by the Palestinians themselves [...] neutralizes some of the énoncés of horror and contributes to the perpetuation of the distinction between occupier and occupied, in a way that blinds one from seeing that what we’ve got here is a common civilian struggle against a ruling power that abandons some of those under its rule.” Are you not worried that this stand that “speaks in the name of the other” might be deemed reactionary?

- A. A. The fantasy of the “authentic voice,” alongside the imperative that the repressed must represent themselves, perpetuate the Palestinians and Israelis as two sides, in a manner that serves the occupation regime. Fear of any hint of erasing the difference between yourself and the Palestinian only perpetuates the discussion of the occupation in terms of two sides, fixating the border issue as the main question – a question whose solution alone can change the situation. I think that the acceptance of the territorial issue as central, which is manifested in the preoccupation with the border, divisions, and settlements, exacts too high a toll – namely, acceptance of the fact that the Palestinians are non-citizens. I don’t speak in the name of the “other,” but rather in the name of the citizenship institution that enables me to interfere in the manner in which myself and others are governed.

AN EXTENDED SPECTRUM

Raviv Ganchrow

Studio Art Magazine no. 159, March-April 2005

An ambitious exhibition at the Centre Pompidou in Paris, titled *Sons & Lumieres: A History of Sound in the Art of the 20th Century*, presents a thematic and chronological view of the various expressions of sound (and music) in the visual arts. The roughly 400 works on display cover a range of mediums, from painting to video and from sound installation to performance, that skirt much of the major developments in the art of the last century. The exhibition is organized around three sub-themes – Correspondences, Imprints and Ruptures, that also define a clear navigation through the space of the exhibition, along a linear sequence of hallways and rooms. The first grouping, "Correspondences – Abstraction, Color Music, Light in Motion" explores the correspondence between painting, color and music; the second grouping, "Imprints – Conversions, Synthesis, Remanence," presents works where the sound wave itself becomes an essential material; and the third, titled "Ruptures – Chance, Noise, Silence," opens the space of noisy expressions through the works of the Futurists, of John Cage and of Fluxus. There is also an appended "Epilogue," presenting two contemporary works: a video by Rodney Graham and an installation by Pierre Huyghe.

A curious proposition is brought up in the first chapter of the exhibition by introducing the topic of sound through painting rather than directly via an audible medium. It suggests forging some sort of link between the efforts of a pictorial history and an emerging auditory practice. The first sequence of works, Kandinsky's *Impression III* (1911), and two paintings by Frantisek Kupka, *The Yellow Scale* (1907) and *Nocturne* (1911), create the foundation for a curatorial promise that is never fulfilled.

Kupka himself alluded to music in his 1913 statement: "I'm still fumbling in the dark, but I think I can find something between sight and hearing and that I can produce a fugue in colors like Bach has done in music."¹ The idea that color can

somehow be structured in a pattern of permutations to create an instantaneous moment of fugueness is one that gets revisited throughout the initial sequence of rooms in the exhibition. Starting with the multicolor compositions of Stanton Macdonald-Write (*Conception Synchrony*, 1914), proceeding through the work of Georgia O'Keefe (*Blue and Green Music*, 1921), and arriving at examples such as Paul Klee's *Fugue in Red* (1921) or Joseph Albers *Fugue II* (1925). The point is exemplified by the incorporation of what seems to be a musicologist's investigation, meticulously drawn on graph paper, of an actual Bach fugue by Henri Nouveau, *Fugue A 4 of the Well-Tempered Clavier No. 1* (1944). This introduction seamlessly merges via Duncan Grant's scroll painting (*Abstract Kinetic Painting with Sound*, 1914), into the moving images of abstract animation in the work of Hans Richter, and in Viking Eggeling's film, *Diagonal Symphony* (1921).

What is stressed in the first chapter of the exhibition is a synesthetic system of correspondences. In fact, the name "Correspondences" was borrowed from the title of a well known poem by Charles Baudelaire dealing with the same topic. Synesthesia expresses itself through the experience of parallel sensations tied together in a knot of coordination. The synesthete possesses the startling capacity to hear color, see sounds or even taste shapes. Synesthesia, as an idea, has long been exploited in the arts and early sciences, in an attempt to align essences. This and other systems of correspondence have their roots (within the European context) in the Pythagorean cultural heritage, finding recurrent echoes over the ages in ideas of mathematic proportions, harmonic relationships and scales which form links to planetary movements, and anthropomorphic mappings of the skies. It is also a system of re-presentation, as in the capacity to evoke that which is not present (or cannot be depicted) by means of an alternate form.

But is Kupka, in his transition to abstraction, presenting us with a synesthetic moment? Is this sequence from musical painting to color in motion what Kupka was suggesting when he spoke of finding that "something between sight and hearing," that in-betweenness? Maybe there remains another current within Kupka that is expressed as an act of fusion (where one form collapses into another) and not as a correspondence: a place where the edges of one sense fold backwards and merge into another to create an extended spectrum of operation.

Kandinsky provides a farther step in this understanding. His painting *Impression III* was completed shortly after he had attended a concert of Arnold Schönberg in Munich, which was probably the inspiration for the work. The painting marks the beginning of an active correspondence between Kandinsky and the composer, that continued until 1914. At the time, Kandinsky had just completed his book *Concerning the Spiritual in Art*,² devoted to an elucidation of his developing notions of *Inner Sound (Innerer Klang)*.

Kandinsky's reference to music extended beyond the metaphorical in his attempt to avert what he saw as a symptom in the art of his time, which was preoccupied with external similarities. This naturalism in art he attributed to a materialistic tyranny that reduced the surroundings to a mundane world of appearance. Art of this sort is caught up in outward appearances and, to his mind, falls short of conveying the true nature of things. He called for a reevaluation of the image as a vehicle towards a renewed contact with essences.

In the book he often refers to composition in order to form analogies with painting. The outer beauty of a composition consists of established proportions and conventions – the harmonic relations between the various notes in the composition, counterpoint and so on. The inner beauty forms a harmonic relation between a tone and an inner attribute of the listener; a kind of sympathetic vibration. In this sense, the outer appearance or structure in a work that strives for inner beauty may turn out to be dissonant in form. Here is also the link to his interpretation of Schönberg's use of dissonance. He recognized in Schönberg the forerunner of a musical beauty that is concerned only with the inner attributes: "His music leads us into a realm where musical experience is a matter not of the ear but of the soul alone."³ In effect, he is suggesting that Schönberg has never abandoned basic harmonic principles. What sounds to the ear as dissonant, regains its harmony at a deeper level of perception. He has simply shifted the mirroring line of symmetry, which conventionally had been sitting between corresponding notes in a piece of music, to a mirroring point that stands between the audible tone and the ineffable mind. These are also the grounds upon which Kandinsky initiated contact with Schönberg in a letter dated January 18, 1911: "At the moment there is a great tendency in painting to discover the 'new' harmony by constructive means,

whereby the rhythmic is built on an almost geometric form. My own instinct and striving can support these tendencies only half-way. Construction is what has been so woefully lacking in the painting of recent times, and it is good that it is now being sought. But I think differently about the type of construction. I am certain that our own modern harmony is not to be found in the 'geometric' way, but rather in the anti-geometric, antilogical [antilogischen] way. And this way is that of 'dissonances in art,' in painting, therefore, just as much as in music... It has given me immense joy to find that you have the same ideas."⁴ It is not that Schönberg's music sounds like a Kandinsky or vice-versa, but rather that they resemble one another in their mode of operation. For Kandinsky, the outward appearance of form (be it in music or painting) was only a means by which to achieve contact with a more pervasive level of existence. His hope was that a communication between his paintings and the people observing them would occur vibrationally, unmediated by symbols. He suggested a form of subtle contact that bypasses the imitative principles of representation. In doing so, he also introduces the listener/viewer as an essential component in the work of art, by means of subtle participation.

But the Pompidou exhibition fails to pick up the lead already in the first rooms of the presentation, as the works shift more and more towards the geometric-compositional modes of expression. The common ground between divergent arts, that Kandinsky proposes to illuminate in terms of frequency, is instead revealed in its social function – creating the opportunity for a coming together of practices. In a revisit to the Wagnerian idea of the Gesamtkunstwerk, an account of Schönberg's *Die Gluckliche Hand* (a 30 minute score with lighting effects) and Kandinsky's experimental *Stage Compositions* (a series of short theater pieces that combined painting, poetry and dance) are presented in the exhibition as the next stage – a thematic choice that misses the opportunity to point out a more fundamental relation between image and sound.

What is missing in the exhibition is a genealogic investigation of the underlying ideas that constitute such radical alterations of the work's apparent form. The choice to pick out the most obvious correspondence between the compositional attributes of music and the stylistic investigations of colors and shapes simply highlights another form of naturalism from which Kandinsky was so adamantly trying to

escape, namely painted music. A categorization of works under this topic already predicts its own end: painting turns into silent animation, which becomes shapes that make sounds, inevitably landing straight back where it started – in music. Kupka and Kandinsky offered another, more obscure suggestion, not towards a style but towards an altered model of perception where communication is understood to operate vibrationally. Had this been taken as the underlying theme of the exhibition, one could have discerned two tendencies that emerge from Kandinsky: one which continues to explore a vibrational notion through a medium of painting, eventually focusing on the presence in chromatic properties; the other branch, intent on making things increasingly tangible, turns to amplification, where vibrations eventually erupt into the world of materials. Klee might have been the next station on the first branch of the genealogic journey, which could lead to Mark Rothko and later to Anish Kapoor (through his use of pigments) and James Turrell (the use of light), among others. Rothko, the most obvious of the latter three figures omitted from the exhibition, has the potential in this context to present the image as an instance of pure vibration, where all compositional considerations have been minimized in order to intensify a purely chromatic presence. What's important to stress here is that this is not merely an alternative proposal of curatorial arrangement, but a tactic which would allow the reading of certain underlying currents that traverse the simplistic borders between picture/sound or harmony/noise, and would inevitably extend the scope of discussion beyond the limits of the twentieth century.

The second branch leading from Kandinsky, the one concerned with a tactile form of vibration, will be traced in this article by re-mapping the material presented in the Pompidou exhibition. First as it emerges from Oskar Fischinger's shape/tone experiments, then through John Cage's thoughts on amplification, that tap into the immersive practices of the Futurists, and finally as it appears in the works of La Monte Young, Bill Viola and Bruce Nauman. This current also charts an increasing engagement of the viewer/listener, marked by a shift from subtle to active participation. Needless to say, this is only one example amongst numerous other genealogic threads inherent within the reservoir of works in the exhibition.

Oskar Fischinger is one of the only figures that appears in both the first and the second chapter of the exhibition. He is mostly remembered for his pioneering

work in the field of abstract animation, which sits on the uneasy crossroads of presentation, experimentation and entertainment. His 1931 film, *Study No. 8*, screened in the first chapter of the exhibition, explores overlapping rhythms and development of forms over time in a kind of lighthearted cinematic elaboration on Klee's fugue. In 1936 Fischinger fled from Europe and settled in California, where he briefly got involved in the early stages of Disney's animation production *Fantasia*. Fischinger, along with several others of the avant-garde, actively engaged in research using emerging technologies. Noteworthy in Fischinger's case are his experiments in hand drawn audio synthesis; a kind of precursor to the development of electronic music.

Already in the early 1920s, László Moholy-Nagy proposed an autonomous phonographic art by directly inscribing the audio tracks into a phonograph record; but it wasn't until the early 1930s, with the arrival of magnetic tape recording and optic sound registration, that these ideas were finally set into motion.⁵ The optic register resides in a thin strip at the edges of the 35 mm. photographic film. It records the fluctuations of sound pressure in the air as varying densities of opacity within the surface of the film. The result is a visual expression of the acoustic event, that appears as a wavering black band on a clear background. When connected to a photoelectric cell, the changes in light intensity produce a fluctuating electrical signal that eventually becomes audible through standard means of amplification.

The potential vested in optic sound cannot be underestimated in the case of Oskar Fischinger, who saw the key to resolving the conflicting account of synesthetic correspondences in the mechanical lock of technology. Detailed patterns and shapes were meticulously transferred onto the optic track of the film via a photographic process, in order to produce complex tones. Fischinger's film *Ornamentes Sonores* (1932), projected in the second chapter of the exhibition, presents each hand-drawn pattern and the corresponding sound it produces. The photoelectric cell became a kind of scientific verification for a direct connection between an image and a corresponding sound.

John Cage and Oskar Fischinger never cross paths in the exhibition, but in 1936, already four years into Fischinger's exploration of shape-sounds, Cage and Fischinger had a brief meeting wherein Fischinger explained to Cage what he

considered to be a spiritism of the material world – in which, according to him, every object is infused with an identity that can be set loose by physically brushing up against it and thus producing its inherent sound. It was this idea that led Cage to percussion. Drumming on objects became the precursor to an approach that extended the understanding of sound to the microscopic level as well as the social field, in an attempt to liberate "all sounds."

In the exhibition, Cage is placed in the third chapter, "Ruptures," between the Futurists and Fluxus. The first in a sequence of three rooms devoted to his work presents a yellowing sheet of paper with typed instructions for the composition *4'33"*; just beside it is Robert Rauschenberg's two-panel *White Painting* (1951), which incidentally is one of the cited sources for Cage's infamous silence piece. To perform *4'33"*, a pianist is instructed to sit in front of a piano for the duration of 4 minutes and 33 seconds without playing a single note, thus shifting the musical experience from the composed utterance to audition. It is no longer the piano that resounds, but rather the movements that comprise the background murmur in the performance hall. By this inversion Cage suggested the extension of musical materiality to the surrounding world of chance, whereby an experience of musicality depends only on an intentional state of mind – namely, that of listening. When Cage asks to let "sounds be themselves," he is also asking to hear a sound as a sound, detached from its referent. In other words, the piano, the passing car and restless audience are all images, and it is only when we can hear the sounds as transforming elastic materials in their own right that a beauty begins to emerge.

The tactic of percussion was replaced with amplification after Cage's notorious visit to the anechoic chamber, where, in the absence of all ambient noise, he still discerned two tones: a low drone (that of his circulating blood) and a high-pitched hum (his nervous system in operation). This permanent non-silence of the body was taken as an indicator for an idea that eventually enveloped all matter. All things are in constant vibration, even if they appear to the eye as motionless. What was lacking was a means by which to make them audible. Cage was not alone in his optimistic endorsement of technology: in a 1933 manifesto, titled "La Radia," Futurists F. T. Marinetti and Pino Masnata anxiously anticipated "the reception, amplification and transfiguration of vibrations emitted by matter. Just as today we

listen to the song of the forest and the sea so tomorrow shall we be seduced by the vibrations of a diamond or a flower.”⁶ The world resonated from within each and every molecule, in a revisit to Kandinsky’s notion of inner sound, with one crucial distinction: when subtle vibrations cross over the threshold and become physically audible, a presence becomes tangible through the sheer force of amplification. This creates a curious condition, where what was previously outside the realm of the senses erupts into apparent reality in a kind of Jungian ooze. This condition short-circuits the subtle participation suggested by Kandinsky and moves towards a model of direct contact. Not only is representation gone, but even the distance traditionally implemented between subject and object, which is necessary to the forming of a contemplative position, is reduced to zero. From then on, impressions imprint themselves in a form of direct and active participation.

Zero distance inevitably means tactile contact, an immersive situation where the entire body gets absorbed within an environment. In this context it is necessary to mention the forerunners of avant-garde immersive practices, who come from the ranks of the Futurists and marched to the tune of Luigi Russolo’s *Art of Noises*. The Futurists do not directly tie into the preceding genealogy, in fact they remain somewhat of a singular event within the early avant-garde. Nonetheless, their total embrace of the sonic rumble inevitably predicts the shift towards tactility. Luigi Russolo’s *Art of Noises* is a term that includes a manifesto published in 1913, a book from 1916, and sound performances conducted with the uniquely designed family of noise-instruments dubbed the *Intonarumori*. At the Pompidou exhibition, the Futurists occupy the first large hall, immediately after the introduction into the third chapter, “Ruptures.” On the walls are various manifestoes by Carlo Carra, F. T. Marinetti and Valentine de Saint-Point, interspersed with drawings by Giacomo Balla and Fortunato Depero. The centerpiece is without doubt the *Intonarumori* display. Meticulously reconstructed in 1977 and presented in a configuration similar to the familiar hexagonal-tiled room photograph from 1916, Russolo’s acoustic noise machines attract as much attention today as they must have back in their performing debut in 1914. The rectangular boxes with protruding horns and rotary arms all have one side removed, exposing the interior mechanism that appears surprisingly unsurprising. Conceived as hybrid instruments – part

percussion, part stringed instrument – it is hard to imagine how their delicately articulated vocality aroused such revolt from attending audiences.

The Futurist's call to embrace the onslaught of noises brought about by the late arrival of industrialization in Italy was more than just an opening of music to the world of mundane sounds. It was a call to war against the stockpile of their own cultural history, an attempt to violently update the means of expression by literally aligning with the sounds of modernization and ultimately military combat itself. F.T. Marinetti's onomatopoeic *parole in liberta* (words-in-freedom) poem, expressing the "Zang Tumb Tuuum" of artillery canons with spoken words, turned from metaphor to proposition in his 1917 "Manifesto of the Futurist Dance" and eventually led several Futurists to actively seek positions in front line trenches during WW1. In a chapter from the book *The Art of Noises*, devoted to "The Noises of War," Russolo proposes the battlefield as an ultimate theatre of sound – where every part of the body is immersed in ecstatic vibration of whistling shells and incoming shock-waves. To reach this perverse and ecstatic state of contact meant forming an allegiance with the very matter of vibration itself.

By the 1960s, the wide-spread availability of amplification meant that it was no longer necessary to enlist in the army in order to experience substantial sounds. Amplification and electro-acoustics also meant a possibility to alter, shape or extend sounds almost indefinitely. The latter category is one of the ongoing topics in the sound work of the American composer La Monte Young, who has extended his music to such lengths that it has ended up as a permanent installation. The Dream House project began in 1966 when La Monte Young and Marian Zazeela pioneered the concept of a continuous sound and light environment. Young describes it as "a time installation measured by setting continuous frequencies of sound and light."⁷ The idea has been explored in several incarnations, with various tunings of sine wave scales. One Dream House has been on exhibit for nearly 15 years at an empty loft on Franklin St. in lower Manhattan. The version presented in the Pompidou contains one of Young's prime-number-based tunings, along with Zazeela's calligraphic cutout shadow mobiles and colored light installations. The Dream House presents an immersive environment, where Young's sine wave clusters form an enveloping aural tapestry of shifting timbre. The sound saturates the room in

an immense standing wave landscape. It is enough to stand in one location and tilt one's head back and forth in order to get a multitude of aural sensations. Zazeela's contribution extends the vibrational spectrum of the work into the realm of light by placing translucent color filters over the windows that convert the outside light into a monotonous violet glare.

Through the lens of Cage, sound emerges as a material in its own right. Once liberated from the constraints of music, it becomes a substance; a flickering presence, part material and part process, that awkwardly finds its place among the other resources of plastic art. It is in these terms, of sound as a structured and constructible material, that one should approach Bill Viola's work *Hallway Nodes* (1972). Within the chronology of the Pompidou exhibition, *Hallway Nodes* is situated in the second chapter, immediately after a room of Nam June Paik's TV experiments and just before several video attempts at sound visualization (a reversal of Fischinger's *Ornamentes Sonores*) by Gary Hill, Steina & Woddy Vasulka, and again Bill Viola. The laboratory-like atmosphere of the piece can mislead one into thinking that this too is an experimental work in the sense of the playful discovery displayed just before in Paik's TV series. But something else is at stake in this radical reduction. The work consists of a hallway, exactly 22 feet in length, with two washing machine sized loudspeakers placed at either end of the hall. The hall is empty, except for a 50 Hz. sine wave that is continuously played back into the space. At this frequency, the tone is physically felt in the body as well as audibly heard. Due to the phasing of opposite waves and reflections from the walls and floor, the sound gets organized in a standing wave pattern, a kind of three dimensional invisible architecture of vibrational intensities that is only perceived as one navigates the empty space. In some places the sound defuses into a distant hum, while in others it becomes a physical rumble. The reduction of the piece to its fundamental components – a hallway of a given length and two loudspeakers emitting a single tone – operates almost as a kind of metaphysical laboratory demonstration. Everything is revealed, including the anticipated experience that is handwritten on the edge of the construction diagram, as if to say that even after all the mystifying veils have been removed the uncanny remains intact. This piece goes back to a time in Viola's work where sound was of primary interest to him. In the

early 1970s he spent a year and a half in Florence, where he began audio recordings of the stone-clad medieval cathedrals: "It impressed me that regardless of one's religious beliefs, the enormous resonant stone halls of the medieval cathedrals have an undeniable effect on the inner state of the viewer. And sound seemed to carry so much a part of the feeling of the ineffable...When I discovered standing wave patterns and the fact that there was a total spatial structure of reflection and refraction, a kind of acoustic architecture in any given space where sound is present, I felt I recognized a vital link between the unseen and the seen, between an abstract inner phenomenon and the outer material world."⁸ In a statement that arcs back to Kandinsky's notions of *Inmerer Klang*, Viola constructs a bridge between the external and the internal through a medium of sound. "Here was an elemental force that was between being a thing and an energy, a material and a process..."⁹

The closing work in the third chapter of the exhibition is Bruce Nauman's *Acoustic Pressure Piece* (1971). It is a simple construction of padded plywood panels standing vertically and intermittently placed on either side of a narrow walkway. The visual appearance is unobtrusive, but when one walks through the narrow passage, just barely noticeable changes in the air pressure and reverberation of the surrounding room acoustics become apparent. One has a sensation of an opening and closing audible space due to the altered acoustics along the padded surfaces. It operates on one's perception much in the same way a *Serra Torqued Ellipse* does: drawing attention to the body's position in space, to gravitational attributes and to the experience of the relation between time and space. The difference is that Nauman does it solely by acoustic means.

Other than the value of the accumulated impressions a visitor experiences through the sheer mass of the presentation, there remain two weaknesses in the exhibition: Nearly thirty years sit between the last works exhibited in chapter three and the two pieces presented in the Epilogue. With this in mind, the epilogue almost seems to be an homage to a chapter in history that has already been closed, especially the reference to Cage's prepared piano in the work titled *A Reverie Interruption by the Police* by Rodney Graham. The days during and after Cage brought forth a flow of sonic experimentation: the early collaborative works of American minimal music, the audio installations of Rolf Julius and Benhard

Leitner, the birth of audio labels such as Tellus, Selektion and WrK, finally spilling over into this century through works by Merzbow, Ryoji Ikeda, Mika Vainio, Mark Bain and Carsten Nicolai. Needless to say, it's a commendable endeavor to even attempt to exhibit nearly one hundred years of creative practice, but the exhibition failed in connecting the lines from the past to present-day audible practices.

The second problem, a more subtle one, concerns not only this exhibition but other attempts at retrospective glances and is an extension of the first outlined problem. Could it not be more revealing to experience La Monte Young's *Dream House* beside a Kandinsky or a Klee, or to view Stanton Macdonald-Wright's color compositions beside Vasulka's hypnotic video dots? If no such curatorial moves are taken, we are in danger of treating our own cultural stockpile with a distinctly virulent form of archaeological absentmindedness – one that reduces the potential of "presenting" to no more than a fetish of "collecting."

- 1 Virginia Spate, *Orphism: The Evolution of Painting in Paris 1910-1914*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p.130.
- 2 Wassily Kandinsky, *Concerning the Spiritual in Art* [1910], distributed on the web via The Project Gutenberg Ebook #55321, 2004.
- 3 Ibid., Ln 42.
- 4 Wassily Kandinsky, excerpt from transcripts of the correspondence between Arnold Schönberg and Wassily Kandinsky, Arnold Schönberg Center, Vienna, Austria.
- 5 For a history of audio technologies see Steve Schoenherr, Recording Technology History, <http://history.acusd.edu/gen/recording/notes.html#origins>.
- 6 F. T. Marinetti and Pino Masnata, "*La Radio*" (1933), trans. Stephen Sartarelli, in *Wireless Imagination: Sound Radio and the Avant-garde*, ed. Douglas Kahn and Gregory Whitehead, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 265-68.
- 7 La Monte Young, quoted on the homepage of the MELA foundation, <http://melafoundation.org/>
- 8 Bill Viola in an interview with Jorg Zutter, *Bill Viola – Mas alla de la mirada*, Museo Nacional, Centro de Arte Reina Sofia, Spain, 1993, p. 134.
- 9 Ibid.

BLACK MILK

Reflections on Moshe Ninio's Stain

Ory Dessau

Studio Art Magazine no. 162, October-November 2005

The work *Stain* is not identical to itself: it is a containment of the space outside its bounds, and it is also its content – an enclave that generates a greater enclave, transforming exterior to interior and back to exterior. *Stain* is both the guarantee for the containment of a space and its enemy from within – an excess that makes attempts at stabilization shaky. The work creates the containment of the space outside its bounds, and at the same time it breaches that very containment which it creates – only to contain a greater space, thus expanding the containment-shaking logic of the work itself as a spatial modus (a box) to the space in which it is located (and therefrom to the magazine page as a type of differentiated space, from one magazine page to another, and from there to the space in which the magazine operates). The conditions for the work's emergence are linked with containment of containment, namely a photograph of a photograph, a negation of a negation, and thus the work's current manifestation makes it possible to imagine movement where there was none, and to perform, each time anew, an arrest that reconstructs the act of *Stain's* taking/capturing, while changing the position and location of its taking, and shifting it. This mode of transmission enables the transformation of *Stain* from an insubstantial image – a shell-like image – to an image/object that emerges as a performative act in the space: an arrest whose reverberation is blocked and echoed back, and so on (subject to the movement of the viewer's body). Thus, the photographs of the spaces in which *Stain* is installed are not documentary. *Stain* involves durable continuation, infinite stretching, trickling, evasion, slow-motioned flickering, rather than surmounting time. Hence, one may discuss *Stain* as a state of retreat, and at the same time, as a constant, tenacious approach.

The work's settling in a given space, *Stain* as an image/object, is founded on a

heterotopic logic – reflection by way of reversal. The negative affinity between the image/object and the space – any space – in which it is presented structures the dialectical status of its location as an other: *Stain* is both an appendage (external to the space while in it, peripheral), an implant (internal to it; the space's other, the other within the space), and also a deserter (a space, blank, attesting to absence, to abandonment of an order that was left behind). *Stain* reflects the space around it as a deviation therefrom – it is the space's shadow, its night – and at the same time, any space whose focal point is a stain is being rediscovered therethrough as nowhere which is everywhere, nowhere that is "connected to all other emplacements, but in such a way that they suspend, neutralize, or reverse the set of relations that are designated, reflected, or represented [*réflechis*] by them."¹ *Stain* generates a heterotopia with regard to the space in which it is exhibited; the space, with *Stain* in it, becomes a heterotopia with respect to all the existing exhibition spaces. *Stain* is the focus that holds the space – burning it at the stake and expropriating it in order to reinstate it differently. It sucks the space in and discharges it. The interrelations of otherness between the box (the object) and the image contained in it (the stain) correspond with the interrelations between the image/object and the space in which it is exhibited, which, in turn, correspond with the relationship between the given space in which *Stain* is exhibited and all existing exhibition spaces.

Stain was originally taken from a black-and-white television set as it screened a helicopter-shot news report, broadcast live: the case of a fire that broke out in a North Sea oil rig. *Stain* is combustion, an oil stain burning on water, an overlapping between the conditions for the image's formation (fire in the dark chamber – camera obscura) and what the image describes (a stain of fire).

This overlapping of the conditions for emergence and its formless contents structures a correlation at the opposite pole to the encounter between a catastrophic image and a formation process exposed with regard to its uncontrollable, unpredictable aspects (television as a technology of apparition, and the stain as that which cannot be delimited, that which cannot be freed from its original circumstances – the index of a fatal event). The image is salvaged on the verge of its disappearance. The threshold of disappearance becomes the threshold of the image's emergence as that which has returned lost and as that which brings back

the loss (rather than what was lost) as a rupture in the screen of representation, in the sequence of signifiers in whose course images appear and disappear. *Stain's* severance from a news edition involves its transition from a resolved historical sequence to the register of the non-historical, a suspension of the historical. Its current mode of transmission, as a partial replay of its taking, the last in a line of replays that have accumulated over the years, not only re-enacts the transition from the historical to the a-historical, but also rekindles *Stain's* continuation as extra-archival, as a presence registered nowhere, which suspends its spectral existence after its having shifted from a documentary order, from reportage status, to a phantasmagoric, imaginary existence. There is no reworking of mourning here, but the emergence of a past that recurs in the present as a non-mournable trauma, as an enhanced image of a disaster whose occurrence stemmed from the expectation of "the return of the prospective," as a delay.

The aspiration to "otherness" which sustains *Stain* has nothing to do with the othernesses spawned by the discourse of the politics of identities. This aspiration is contrasted to the fact that television, with its screened images, as anomalous and catastrophic as they may be, is not experienced as the other of the domestic and commercial spaces in which it is embedded. At the same time, *Stain's* very occurrence offers an intensified approach to behavioral patterns vis-à-vis a turned on television set, as formulated by Marshall McLuhan. McLuhan referred to television as a cold medium which forces one to fill in the gaps, compelling active participation that reawakens community values. He did not perceive these patterns as a mode of viewing, but as a tactile affinity, physical responsiveness realized in the act of "filling in" informational gaps. *Stain* is a by-product an intensified approach to those tactile patterns, but in fact, it is their total opposite. It assumes an opening up, a space of simultaneity and simultaneity as space. There is no confrontation of subject and object here, but an automatic array of optical mechanisms that are concurrently revived, across the subject (satellite, broadcasting authority, television camera, automatic camera, human sight mechanism). The viewer is in the middle, in-between, between *Stain* and itself, between *Stain* and the twin waterfalls which were taken a split second after *Stain*, from a slightly different angle of the helicopter, and presented together as a series, as an interspaced sequence, in

"Cycle of Days."² The physical intervals between those works enable the viewer to exist in suspended time – split seconds that stretch up to the present – and outside the category of critical distance, which was abandoned in favor of drifting within the vision uprooted from its mass media-ness. In this context, Walter Benjamin's answer to his own question comes to mind: what, in the end, makes advertisements so superior to criticism? Not what the moving neon sign says, but the fiery pool reflecting it in the asphalt.³

Stain unfolds a moment in which a contingent image becomes an image/signal. *Stain* plays this process backwards, a rewind where an unpredictable, random image that approaches you transforms into an image which you approach, and immediately thereafter reverts to being an image that emerges as a re-presentation which is in dialectic confrontation with a (first) presentation. The power of re-presentation imprints *Stain* with the stamp of reincarnation, the imprint of an empty iconic form, and only then does it introduce issues to the surface such as accuracy, maximal control, and sovereignty. In its significations of a closed system, *Stain* is also an act vis-à-vis entropic models (the perception of time running out, the global energy crisis – *Stain* as a burning oil stain); as a form, however, *Stain* may be discussed in terms of a transcendent contingent form.

The traumatic aspects inherent in the emergence of *Stain* are reinforced in correlation to the understanding of the affinity between *Stain*'s mode of emergence and early models in the history of photography, mainly the daguerreotype and ambrotype. The ambrotype is a glass surface whose conditions of emergence required a dark backing, in the absence of which it looked like a negative. Only after the black fabric was applied to the back of the glass plate did the image, clearly marked on it, become visible. *Stain* is a transparency placed between two glass plates. The comparison between the ambrotype's mode of appearance and that of *Stain* calls for an accurate distinction. While in the case of the ambrotype the attachment of a foreign yet neutral element is part of the display, in the case of *Stain*, this fastening of two glass surfaces is formulated as part of the work's "text," the sequence of actions functioning as a means for cooling the image of disaster. *Stain*'s affinity with early forms of photography is congruent with the manner in which other works by Moshe Ninio, such as the floor hologram *Rainbow:Rug*,

direct the viewer's body: like the daguerreotype and ambrotype, the hologram's image can be fully perceived from one angle only, thus responding to the freezing element of the optical mechanism by freezing the viewer's body – a freezing over freezing. *Stain* is rooted in the world of concepts and procedures coined in the period after the invention of photography, a world in which negative is positive, and an image perceived in the blink of an eye is the result of a long, complicated chemical and operative process possibly indicating the way in which the original transparency of *Stain* was manipulated over the years. Furthermore, the work refers to other forms of photography/event: it oscillates between its definition as the product of a photochemical mechanism and its definition as an image generated by a photoelectric mechanism – television – and then rendered by a photochemical mechanism.

Stain is a perceptive autarchic unit, whose perception is manifested in the work's ability to contain the space beyond it, to suck it in and remain outside that which was sucked, and shift from a lower level of perception (the stain as a fragment, a remnant of an event) to a higher level of perception (the stain as a finite shape). The work is evidence of the way in which a finite image, such as a television image, a ready-made image, transforms into an infinite image which dissolves its boundaries from within and stretches into a restless movement which may, at the same time, remain latent.

- 1 Michel Foucault, "Different Spaces," in James Faubion (ed.) *Michel Foucault: Aesthetics: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984* (London: Penguin, 1994), p. 178.
- 2 Moshe Ninio's solo exhibition at the Israel Museum, Jerusalem, 1991.
- 3 See Walter Benjamin, "One-Way Street," in *One-way Street and Other Writings*, trans. K. Shorter (London and New York: Verso, 1997).

ISRAELI ARCHITECTURE, 1970s-1980s

Special Issue Edited by Zvi Elhyani, Yael Bergstein

Studio Art Magazine no. 164, April-May 2006

Studio 164 casts a retrospective gaze upon post-1967 construction in Israel, and examines a continuum of images culled from an archive-in-process of Israeli architecture. This issue constitutes a partial, almost arbitrary visual sketch for a future study of both the known and the hidden origins of contemporary Israeli architecture; it looks back upon postmodern developments in the 1970s and 80s – an uncharted body of knowledge that has yet to be academically or publicly validated in the canon of Israeli architectural history.

The discourse about 1970s Israeli architecture as a period of crisis is no longer valid. The Israeli architectural project during the 70s was no less national and international than it was during the national and international Israeli architecture in the 1950s and 60s. Yet a necessary blurring of the artificial turning point 1948 may sift the national architectural ethos from the 50s and 60s and see them as no more than a continuation of the modernist 30s and 40s – a local form of a late international style and of postwar architectural culture. "Israeli architecture" started developing in the aftermath of the 1967 war and continued to evolve in the period that followed, between the wars of 1970, 1973 and 1982. It is a postmodern project more than a modern one, and research into the roots of its postmodernism is necessary in order to understand contemporary Israeli architecture.

Nationalist authority, apocalypse, farce, a collapse of values, bureaucratic disarray, sectorial urges, folkloric tastes and Brutalist practice are among the characteristics of the formless era, during which "the entire country," to quote from Zvi Efrat's book *The Israeli Project*, "was filled within a decade with a jumble of terraced, cantilevered, multi-angled-and-corniced structures, truncated and coated with decorative elements" (2005, p. 935). The early phase of Israeli architectural postmodernism was too quickly judged – paradoxically, by postmodernist critics, who did not perceive this period as a critical instant for an understanding of

contemporary Israeli architecture; an instant prior to a local and international reevaluation of postmodern design.

Those who are still considered "the lost generation" of Israeli architects – educated at the Israeli Institute of Technology (Technion) during the post-1967 decade by the 1948 architects and developing in their shadow – were moved by the critical, democratic, international spirit of the late 60s and were influenced by late modernist, Brutalist formalism. Influenced by the progressive and technologically advanced architecture of the early 70s, they reformulated Israel as a place as well as places in Israel. The year 1967 was merely a catalyst, or an excuse, for what would have taken place in Israeli architecture sooner or later. Sharp angles and cornices, arches, terraced structures and fortress-like features were also characteristic of late modernist architecture in the 60s and early 70s in France, Switzerland, Scandinavia, Italy, England and the USA. A security-oriented, defensive or aggressive reading of 70s architecture in Israel cannot but be superficial.

The quarter designed by Salo Hershman in the Gilo neighborhood of Jerusalem, for instance, presented in this issue, was perceived as one of the icons of a new local architecture in the early 70s; it is a quintessential example of a transitional historical object, modernist at heart, whose language is postmodern (a complex of interrelated structures rather than autonomous buildings; the quarter as a micro-city; pseudo-historical façades) but which was copied and reproduced according to a modernist paradigm in other cities in Israel such as Lod and Tira; in a proposal for a national library in Iran; or in the stone building of the Tel Aviv Cinematheque, built in the 80s. No *genius loci* replaced the international *Zeitgeist* of the time in Israeli architecture of the 70s, and the concept of "place" remained as artificial, neutral and mobile as it was during the 50s and 60s; the arches and stone of Gilo are as absurd as a stone building in Tel Aviv or new arches in Iran.

The recession of the mid-60s was replaced after 1967 by a euphoric wave of new construction, no less intensive than the post-1948 construction project; Ram Carmi, then a senior and influential teacher at the Technion, assumed a key position as the chief architect of the Ministry of Housing, where he advanced the implementation of some of the Brutalist morphological experiments of the 60s (the avant guard formalism of the 60s was given concrete form in Zvi Hecker's "beehive" buildings in

the Ramot neighborhood of Jerusalem, for instance); a group of architects who had built in Tel Aviv during the 60s (Yaski, Rechter, Sharon, Eitan, Zolotov, Hershman, Nadler and others) rediscovered Jerusalem and filled it with towers, hotels and concentric rings of buildings in the city's new neighborhoods; concurrently, they were involved in planning and building multifunctional complexes in the heart of big cities, local versions of the international mega-structures of the 60s – including the complex of high-rise office buildings in the Manshiya neighborhood, Dizengoff Center and the new central bus station in Tel Aviv, the Clal Center and Wolfson Towers in Jerusalem, and the auditorium complex, Panorama Center and central bus station in Haifa; The 70s were the Jerusalem decade, a time of obsessive public delegitimization of the historical center of Tel Aviv, the declining, "foreign," modernist city – prior to its "Bauhausian" rediscovery in the 80s and 90s.

The 70s were also years of industrialized building. Moshe Safdie planned versions of his Montreal "Habitat" in Jerusalem and designed the famous IDF's Merkava tank (a commission from Reserve Major General Israel Tal); this was the period of corporate buildings and office towers; of the ongoing rehabilitation of historical urban neighborhoods; of the beginning of the political settlement in Gaza, the West Bank, the Sinai Desert and the Golan Heights; of continuing the policy of population dispersal from the center of the country to semi-rural towns and villages; of the ascendance of the political Right in 1977, which was followed by suburban development projects and the rehabilitation of modernist neighborhoods; of the building of Yamit in 1975, an urban exercise in planning a postmodern settlement for 2,000 residents in northwestern Sinai, and its dismantling in 1982 following the peace agreement with Egypt; of rising standards of living in Israel and the upgrading of construction standards; of the beginning of the death of the street and the rise of shopping centers and malls; of wall-to-wall interior design, and exterior design with new raw materials – ceramic mosaics, granolite and curtain walls made of metal and glass; and of processing plaster into stucco, en route to the "rediscovery" of stone, which abounds in Israeli architecture in the past few years.

ON ANRI SALA'S EXHIBITION, GALERIE
CHANTAL CROUSEL, PARIS

Zvi Szir

Studio Art Magazine no. 165, May-June 2006 (Excerpt)

Sala is one of those artists who in the past few years are most distinctively preoccupied with the formulation of a new sort of sensitivity. Artists who are in touch with their political existence in a new, personal, complex way. For them, the political existence of people and things, of subject and object, is an inseparable component of the surface, of their visibility. Sala seems to move in the spaces of urban culture (not necessarily in the large metropolis, but in a post-nature world) while refusing to distinguish between the formal, phenomenological and political existence of things; he views their socio-political being as a discernible feature that is immanent in things – like their texture, like the reflections of light on the window or the surface of a gate. Sala's practice contains the political to such an extent of awareness that it enables interior and exterior, public and private, figure and texture to come together. The social awareness of this art does not limit it to the bounds of political art; the political is one of its several planes, and not necessarily the most favored. In this sense, the work of Sala and Gabriel Orozco, for instance, is closer to Goya or Klee's painting than to the kind of political art that is characterized by a distinct political rhetoric, such as Thomas Hirschhorn or Santiago Sierra's.

FACING THE PREFACE

Some Introductory Remarks on Diti Almog's Paintings

Irad Kimhi

Studio Art Magazine, no. 166, July-August 2006 (Abstract)

Irad Kimhi discusses the paintings of Israeli Artist Diti Almog (currently showing at the Tel Aviv museum if Art). The main point of this piece is that the message of these paintings is the medium, which is the mode of existence of painting. These paintings show that the medium is unrepresentable by either painting or non-painting. Thus, a painting has no image or self-image – it cannot introduce its own strange mode of existence by a reflection nor by *mise-en-abîme*. These paintings introduce the unrepresentable not as something that lies beyond the representable but as something that is immanent in the painterly-image itself. They expose the strange space in which paintings exist.

TOUCHING THE PAINFULNESS OF THE GAZE

*On Adam Rabinowitz's Exhibition "Tardemon",
Tel Aviv Museum of Art*

Äim Deüelle Luski

Studio Art Magazine no. 167, November-December 2007 (Excerpt)

Adam Rabinowitz's exhibition, "Tardemon," takes place in a space of hermeneutic interpretation – an experience which is on the boundary-line between the textual and visual, exceeding visual mimesis. Moving through the exhibition, the spectator becomes aware of the gaze of a monkey as it turns and faces him; as a result, he tells himself the story of the monkey – which we have turned into something pre-human, placing it in pre-modern times, prior to any clear distinction between nature and culture. Anthropological time, according to which the monkey is the origin of man, haunts historical time a like a specter, pointing out the manner by which we have defined the animal as such.

Rabinowitz takes on the role of the magician, the tribal shaman – a manifestation of his notion of the artist's role as one who poisons wells. (The show's title, "Tardemon," is the name of a Strychnine-like poison; art is the clinical place where "poisons" are created.) He wishes to contemplate the artist as exposing the truth – not by rational means, but rather by emotional ones, by means of a structure that both precedes and follows rationality; a critical structure. The critical stance is activated as the spectator's "naturally told" stories are undermined, only to be re-created in an a lustful club atmosphere, in a beckoning place where there is no sense of alienation, a place filled with misty smoke and round elements (balls, moon). Rabinowitz breaks down the walls, creating a space that has no exterior definition but only an interiority which is defined by our movement through it, generating intimacy while creating the spectator as physical, sensual movement. Thus he creates a different kind of nature, which lies beyond modernism: both a place of longing and the destruction of all possibility of longing.

HOW THE WORLD UNFOLDS

*On Eli Petel's Exhibition "Original Nature,"
Tel Aviv Museum of Art*

Äim Deüelle Luski

Studio Art Magazine no. 167, November-December 2007 (Excerpt)

At the center of Eli Petel's project is the artist's utter skepticism in relation to sight – attesting to the eye's failure, its inability to gauge the way the world unfolds itself before us. Petel presents an intermediate state, linking together ornamentation or illustration with painterly values. Like many contemporary artists, he re-presents the notion that one mustn't forego the language of media or the representations it engenders in favor of the conceptual or metonymic language of "real," traditional painting; the notion that the polarization between these two languages can no longer be preserved in the pure state characteristic of modernism.

The tension in Petel's installation is built through awareness of the rift between what is "given," what is present to the senses – the experience that animated early modernist painting and begot modern art as a narrative of turning a sensual lie into clear knowledge by means of painting – and the present condition, in which the eye has relinquished all directness and knows, following Guy Debord and the Situationists, that all that appears to it is mediation, beyond which nothing is known, nothing is knowable. The tension between the thrill of the modernist revelation (still evident in contemporary painting and photography) and the discovery of the surface of the digital screen as a no-less challenging stimulation creates/presents defenseless, bare painting, devoid of the peacock feathers of the 'aesthetic' – painting that thus remains in the darkness of the real, in the place of the self from which it has always attempted to distance itself. That is where a different kind of painting can be born: painting which is a place that is not a place, content without representation, shape rather than product. Petel's games of obedience/disobedience to the rules of art after modernity (which have turned into

the law of what is lawless) oblige him to seek that which preceded painting, that which enabled the experience of the nineteenth century that we are still at a loss to comprehend. He leads the spectator through the nomadic routes he fearlessly constructed in the museum's modernist space, hanging his pictures, with deliberate carelessness, on temporary structures made of corrugated board – and the divided space, with no pretensions to the sublime, retreats from itself and negates the eye.

THE DESCENT INTO SHAME

Joan Copjec

Studio Art Magazine no. 168, February-March 2007

Iranian films are an exotic experience for audiences accustomed to Hollywood-dominated cinema. Not just for obvious reasons, but because the obvious – the foreign locations and people, everything we actually see on screen – is produced by a different distribution of the visible and the invisible and an alien logic of the look.

One of the most spectacular heralds of Iran's 1978-1979 Islamic Revolution was the torching of spectacle. Movie theatres – in one horrific case, with the audience still in it – were set on fire, incinerated by fundamentalists. Fittingly, in this respect, Khomeini spoke, in his very first public appearance as Iran's new leader, not only of his intent to restore the authority of the mullahs and purge the country of all foreign influences, Eastern and Western, he also directly addressed the question of cinema. As might be expected, he vehemently denounced it as "prostitution," as the "Shah's cinema," but he deliberately refrained from banning it outright as a wicked modern invention. For, even he could recognize the value of film, the potential for mobilizing it for his grand scheme of re-educating the people in the ways of Islam. Post-revolutionary Iran witnessed the flourishing of a heavily subsidized and officially promoted cinema, though one strictly regulated by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, which explicitly forbid the smallest details betraying foreign influence – such as the wearing of ties or bow ties, the smoking of cigarettes, the drinking of alcohol, and so on – and, more globally, any infraction of the Islamic system of *hejab*. In its strictest sense, *hejab* is a veil or cloth covering for women that obscures them from the sight of men to whom they are not related; but in its widest sense it is the entire "system of modesty" that conceals the very shape of women, which always risks being revealed through gesture and movement. Indeed, *hejab* seems to be motivated by the belief that there is something about women that can never be covered up enough and thus the task of veiling is buttressed by

architectural design and rigid social protocols that further protect women from exposure.

The impact of *hejab* regulations on cinema was massive.¹ Not only the figure and movement of the woman, but the very look directed at her needed to be veiled. Strictures against the eros of the unrelated meant that not even religiously allowed forms of erotic engagement between men and women could be represented, since filming exposed women to the extra diegetic look of the director, crew, and, of course, the audience. Thus the look of desire around which Hollywood-dominated cinema is plotted had to be forsaken, along with the well-established system of relaying that look through an alternating pattern of shots and counter-shots and the telling insertion of psychologically motivated close-ups. Besides restricting narrative situations and tabooing the most common style of editing, the system of modesty also obliged any filmmaker committed to maintaining a modicum of realism to shoot outdoors. Although in real life Iranian women need not and do not wear head-scarves at home, in cinematic interiors they were forced to don them because of the presence, once again, of the extradiegetic look which exposed them to the view of unrelated men. Incongruous images of headscarves in scenes of family intimacy were more than unrealistic, they were oftentimes risible and thus filmmakers tended to avoid domestic scenes as much as possible. Ultimately, then, interiority was one of the most significant cinematic casualties of *hejab*. Iranian cinema came to be composed *only* of exterior shots, whether in the form of actual spatial exteriors – the improbable abundance of rural landscapes and city streets, which is a hallmark of Iranian cinema – or in the form of virtual exteriors – interior domestic spaces in which women remained veiled and isolated from desire, outside the reach of any affectionate or passionate caress. The challenge facing all Iranian filmmakers, then, is to make credible and compelling films under these conditions, namely: the censorship of interiority, of intimacy.

Revelations of American torture of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib brought to light an abusive misunderstanding of the Islamic system of modesty. It turns out that *The Arab Mind*, a book first published in 1973 and reprinted only a few months prior to the invasion of Iraq, got into the hands of pro-war Washington conservatives and became, in the words of one academic, “the bible of the neo-cons

on Arab behavior.” Of special interest to these conservatives was a chapter on Arabs and sex which argued that, “The segregation of the sexes, the veiling of women... and all the other minute rules that govern and restrict contact between men and women, have the effect of making sex a prime mental preoccupation in the Arab world.”² It was this sort of speculation which was responsible for planting the idea that shame would be the most effective device for breaking Iraqi prisoners down psychologically. According to a report in *The New Yorker*, two themes emerged as “talking points” in the discussions of the strategists: 1) “Arabs only understand force” and 2) “the biggest weakness of Arabs is shame and humiliation.”³ In brief, shame was chosen as the method of torture precisely because the torturers believed that Arab culture made the prisoners particularly vulnerable to it.

This belief was nourished on the banquet of that crude, and one would have thought, thoroughly discredited sociological division of the world into “guilt cultures” and “shame cultures.” The distinction classifies guilt as an affect characteristic of advanced cultures, whose members have graduated to the stage where they possess an internal principle of morality, and shame as a “primitive” affect characteristic of cultures forced to rely, for want of such a principle, on the approving or disapproving gaze of other people to monitor morality. Let me focalize my criticisms by offering my own curt and contrary thesis: *the affects of shame and guilt are improperly used to define kinds of cultures; for, what they define, rather, is a subject's relation to her culture.* I use *culture* here to refer to a form of life that we inherit at birth, to all those things – such as family, race, ethnicity, and national identity – we do not choose, but which choose us. Call them gifts of our ancestors. The manner in which we assume this inheritance, and the way we understand what it means to keep faith with it, are, I argue, what determine shame or guilt.

Distancing herself from this dubious correlation of affects with stages of cultural and moral development, Eve Sedgwick offers an alternative to the neo-conservative view of shame while reflecting on her own experience of shame in the aftermath of another violent confrontation between America and Islam, the attack of September 11. Sedgwick tells us that she was suddenly overcome by shame whenever she happened, after September 11, to catch a glimpse of the void that now occupied the site where the Twin Towers once stood.³ This odd example of the

affect is well suited to her argument, first because it effectively illustrates the point that shame is not caused by prohibition or repression. If the occasion of shame is the surprising of my own look by another that “overlooks” it, this second, alien look must not be construed as one of condemnation, disapproval, or prohibition. My look is deflected or disarmed, not by any (negative) judgment, but in response to the rupturing of an interpersonal bridge, the interruption of the comforting circuit of recognition by which my look sends back to me an image that confirms my identity. My look is interrupted by a blank stare, a voided vision. Like most New Yorkers, Sedgwick no doubt relied on the reassuring sight of the Towers to orient herself in the city; their absence then represented a disappointment of expectations and a loss of familiar coordinates. The blush or, “betraying blazon of an interrupted narcissistic circuit,”⁴ that arose in response may have represented a bruise to her urban identity, but this bruise was not accompanied by any sentiment of rejection or abjection. Rather, a kind of group feeling, a feeling of solidarity with others arose along with the wound. This paradox has often been commented upon: shame is at once the most isolating of feelings *and* a basic social response, a movement “toward individuation *and* toward uncontrollable relationality,” or social contagion.⁵

The challenge to understanding shame lies in interpreting this paradox. The one unfortunate error Sedgwick makes is to insist that the shame she felt after 9/11 was not for herself, but for the missing Towers; that is, she interprets the social sentiment as a feeling of shame for or on behalf of something other than herself. In so doing she gives shame an object, the missing edifices. The effect of this error was to permit a whole literature on shame to sprout within queer theory whereby queers take themselves as the despised objects of shame and in a second, compensatory movement convert the common trait of their abjection into a badge of honor and the basis of group feeling. Shame in other words is here thought to bind individuals into a group by becoming that which they share: they form the group of all rejected or excepted from the larger group of the “normal.” This disastrous misunderstanding can begin to be challenged by making it clear that the phrase “shame for” is, strictly speaking, a solecism. I feel shame neither for myself nor for others because shame is intransitive; it has no object. Shame is there in place of an object in the ordinary sense (though, as we will see, shame is “not without object”

or, in the Lacanian vocabulary, it concerns the object a). To experience shame is to experience oneself not as a despised or degraded object, but to experience oneself as a subject. I am not ashamed of myself, I am the shame I feel: shame is there *in the place of* an object. Giorgio Agamben puts this clearly when he designates shame as the “proper emotive tonality of subjectivity,” as “the fundamental sentiment of being a subject.”⁶ The entire thrust of Sedgwick’s argument, in fact, goes in this direction; shame she says is the sentiment that “attaches to and sharpens the sense of who one is.”⁷ The searing pain associated with shame is not one of being turned by another into an object, of being degraded; it has to do with the fact that one is not “integrated”⁸ with oneself, one is fundamentally split from oneself. (But isn’t this the very definition of a subject?)

Let us delay for a bit the full explication of the paradox of shame to turn once more to the Islamic system of modesty which we will view through the cinema of Abbas Kiarostami, one of the most famous directors to make films under this system. What gives the neo-conservative association of shame and *hejab* its legs, of course, is the fact that they both involve veiling. In the modesty system and in shame a barrier is erected, a curtain drawn, looks are averted and heads bowed heads. On first approach, then, no director would seem to be more in tune with the *hejab* system than Kiarostami, for his is a cinema of respectful reserve and restraint. This reserve is expressed most emblematically in his preference for what can be described as “discreet” long-shots. In moments of dramatic intimacy, especially – a skittish suitor’s approach to the girl he loves; the meeting between a man who impersonates another and the man he impersonates – Kiarostami’s camera tends to hold back, to separate itself from the action by inserting a distance between itself and the scene and refusing to venture forward into the private space of the characters. So marked is the tactfulness of his camera that Kiarostami sometimes seems a reluctant filmmaker.

In light of this overall filming strategy, one sequence from *The Wind Will Carry Us* (1999) stands out as an aberration. In this sequence, Behzad – a documentary filmmaker who has traveled to the Kurdish village of Siah-Darreh with his crew to film the ceremony of scarification still practiced by mourning villagers after someone from the village dies – Behzad, biding his time as he awaits the imminent

death of Mrs. Malek, the village's oldest inhabitant, amuses himself by attempting to purchase some fresh milk from Zeynab, a young village girl and the fiancé of a grave digger he has befriended. Hamid Dabashi, author of a book on Iranian cinema and normally a great admirer of Kiarostami, excoriates the director for the utter shamelessness of this sequence in which, in Dabashi's view, an Iranian woman's privacy and dignity are raped by a boorish Iranian man, whose crime is all the more offensive for being paraded before the eyes of the world.⁹ This is what Dabashi sees: Behzad descending into a hidden, underground space, penetrating the darkness that protects a shy, unsophisticated village girl from violation, and aggressively trying to expose her, despite her obvious resistance, to the light from the lamp he tries to shine on her, to his incautious look, his lies, and his sexual seduction.

Anxiety and the "Inexpressible Flavor of the Absolute"

Before offering an alternative reading of this sequence, I want to set out the background that allows me to distinguish my reading from that of Dabashi. His disdain for Behzad is heavily informed by his assessment of the protagonist as simply a Tehrani interloper adrift in rural Iran. This reading of the puzzled and sometimes combative disorientation of Behzad – a characteristic he shares with many of Kiarostami's protagonists, who are almost all screen doubles of the director – is a common one: geographically and culturally displaced, the modern urban sophisticate finds himself at a loss amidst rural peoples and traditions. One is obliged to note, however, that it is as much the peri-urban character of these rural areas as their pristine primitiveness, notably in decline, which catches Kiarostami's eye. Cell phone reception may not always be good in the villages, but new telecommunications systems are already being installed and the sight of random television antennas on thatched roofs assure us that no one in this part of the world need miss a simulcast soccer game. Regarding the traditional ceremony of scarification, for example, we learn in the course of the film that it has been retrofitted, turned long ago into a means of advancing oneself on the professional ladder. Whenever a relative of one of the bosses dies, the workers compete for the distinction of being the most loyal mourner, exhibiting their self-scarred faces and

bodies in hopes of impressing their boss and being rewarded with a promotion. Incipient capitalism is here in bed with traditional culture, exploiting rather than eliminating it.

This abbreviation of the distance between Behzad and the villagers does not exonerate his insensitive behavior, but it does suggest that we need to look elsewhere for an explanation for his disorientation, which is more profound than the narrative alibi implies. Like other Kiarostami protagonists, Behzad behaves, I will argue, less like a rootless or de-territorialized modern man, than like one who has been uprooted from this is unrootedness to become riveted to a culture, a land, an ethnicity that is opaque to him and which he tries, without much success, to understand by engaging in a quasi-ethnographic exploration of them. That modernity melted everything solid into air is an exaggerated claim, but it was expected to soften at least all that had been solid to the consistency of clay, to render everything, including the subject, infinitely pliable, manipulable. Contrary to expectations, however, modern, supposedly malleable, man found himself stuck to something, to a bit of reality that tore him from the free-flowing current of modern life. It is as if a drain hole or counterforce were inexplicably opened in the modern world, lending our fleeting “temporal existence...the inexpressible flavor of the absolute...[and giving rise to] an acute feeling of being held fast.”¹⁰ That this riveting or reterritorialization is a confounding fact of modern life and no mere theoretical abstraction is evidenced most notably in all the stubborn outbreaks of national, ethnic, racial, and religious loyalties at a moment when such loyalties could have been expected to dissipate.

As is known, modernity was founded on a definitive break with the authority of our ancestors, who were no longer conceived as the ground for our actions or beliefs. And yet this effective undermining of their authority confronted us with another difficulty; it is as if in rendering our ancestors fallible we had transformed the past from the repository of their already accomplished deeds and discovered truths into a kind of holding cell of all that was unactualized and unthought. The desire of our ancestors and thus the virtual past, the past that had never come to pass, or was not yet finished, weighed disturbingly on us, pressing itself on our attention.

The theorization of this unfinished past is concentrated, in the West, around the concept of anxiety.¹¹ If it seemed necessary to come to terms theoretically with anxiety – as it did to Kierkegaard, Freud, and Heidegger, among others – this is surely because this affect bore witness to this new relation to the past. The assumption that modern man would become pliable – to market forces or the force of his own will, depending on the starting point of one’s argument – rested on the belief that the break with an authoritative past placed a zero in the denominator of our foundations, rooted us in or attached us to – nothing. Anxiety, the affect that arises in moments when radical breaks in the continuity of existence occur, belies this assumption. Strangely, anxiety often overtakes revolutionaries immediately after a revolution, which seems not to free the hand that would draft a new constitution, but to paralyze it. How to understand this curious phenomenon? While many psychoanalytic thinkers conceived anxiety as the affective response to loss or abandonment, Freud insisted that the proper response to loss would be mourning – not anxiety. Like Freud, the philosophers mentioned conceived anxiety as dependent not on an actual condition, albeit one of loss, but rather on “a condition that is not.” Kierkegaard offered a clarifying illustration of the difference: the feeling of anxiety is not captured, he said, by the complaint, “My God, why hast thou forsaken me?” but rather by the entreaty, “Whatever you are going to do Lord, do quickly!”¹² Anxiety is the experience not of a loss that has happened but the experience of awaiting some event, something that has not happened.

The break instituted by modernity did not cause the past to become effectively dead to us, its retreat turned out to be modal (that is, it became a matter of the virtual, not the actual past) rather than total. We were thus not left simply alone in a cloistral present cut off from our ancestors, but found ourselves alone with something that did not clearly manifest itself. Anxiety is this feeling of being anchored to an alien self from which we are unable to separate ourselves nor to assume as our own, of being connected to a past that, insofar as it had not happened, was impossible to shed. Our implication in the past was thus deepened. For, while formerly a subject’s ties to her past were strictly binding, they were experienced as external, as of the order of simple constraint. One had to submit to a destiny one did not elect and often experienced as unjust. But one could – like Job or the heroes

and heroines of classical tragedies – rail against one’s destiny, curse one’s fate. With modernity this is no longer possible. The “God of destiny” is now dead and we no longer inherit the debts of our ancestors, but become that debt. We cannot distance ourselves sufficiently from the past to be able to curse the fate it hands us, but must, as Lacan put it, “bear as jouissance the injustice that horrifies us.”¹³ What does this mean?

We can answer this question by returning to the hand paralyzed by anxiety. If, stricken by anxiety, my hand goes on strike, refuses to write, it is because it has become saturated with libido or gripped by jouissance. My hand behaves, Freud explains, like a maid who, having begun a love affair with her master, refuses to continue doing her household chores.¹⁴ In the moment of anxiety, we are gripped by our own jouissance as the very object-cause of our actions, but the experience is of being parasitized by an alien object so suffocatingly close that we cannot discern what it is. In his essay on Melville’s *Bartelby* – the scrivener who goes on strike because he prefers not to fulfill the tasks he was hired for – Agamben unintentionally suggests a way to push Freud’s argument further.¹⁵ The essay is not about anxiety but about potentiality and Agamben’s primary argument is that if potentiality were only a potential to be or do something, we could not experience it as such, since it would dissolve into the experience of actually existing or doing something. But because we do experience a potentiality distinct from actuality, we must then suppose that there exists an *impotentiality*, a potential not to be or do, that precedes potentiality. *Bartelby* becomes the exemplary figure of this impotentiality, the first manifestation of a subject’s power or capacity. Psychoanalysis, we well know, names this capacity libido (or jouissance) and it, too, acknowledges that this capacity must first be the power to not be or do when it posits the existence of the death drive. If one is committed to the existence of libido or jouissance, it is necessary to believe in the speculative notion of the death drive. Anxiety can be understood as the affect that registers our encounter with the death drive – or our own capacity as such. This capacity is not at the behest of autonomous will, however, but attaches us, rather, to the ontologically incomplete past into which we are born, or: jouissance is the affective result of our relation to ancestral desire.

That Kiarostami’s films are haunted by such an inexplicable attachment to

the past is clear enough. Cemeteries are a characteristic topos of the films. In *The Wind Will Carry Us*, for example, one of the primary locations of the film is the cemetery in which Youssef, a gravedigger, digs continuously throughout the film. Youssef thus remains underground for most of the film and is thus invisible to us, as are several other characters. Asked by an interviewer what these curious visual absences signified, Kiarostami replied that the film was about “beings without being.”¹⁶ Eventually the ground caves in on Youssef, who has to be dug out. The unsteadiness of the ground is not, however, unique to this film, it is a constant in Kiarostami’s work, where the earth is always caving in, buckling, heaving, quaking. Scarred by cavernous pits, filmed at angles that suggest they might at any moment swallow up built structures and people, the ground continuously throws up rubble and forces inconvenient detours. In other words, the ground, like the past buried in it, turns out to be in these films a very unsettled affair. It is as if the past itself were constantly under construction.

In *Where Is the Friend’s House?* (1986) this disturbing, anxiogenic surplus takes the form of a notebook which a young school boy is sure is not his own, though it appears in all particulars exactly like his. He spends the majority of the film trying to return it, unsuccessfully, mysteriously deciding in the end not to give it back to its ostensible owner but instead to write an original composition in it. In *Taste of Cherry* (1997), this strange surplus fails to take a concrete form and instead infuses the film with a perplexing textual opacity. The film follows a middle-aged man, Mr. Badii, who has no discernible reason for discontent (far from it) and yet spends the entire film trying to find an accomplice to his suicide, one who will promise to cover him with twenty shovels-full of dirt and double check to make sure he is really and truly dead. From this we suspect that Mr. Badii is bothered by a fear of being buried alive. It is as if he were trying not simply to suicide himself but to extinguish some excess of self that does not respond to his wishes and thus impresses him as capable of surviving even his death.

Speaking in an interview about *Taste of Cherry*, Kiarostami offered this comment: “the choice of death is the only prerogative possible...because everything in our lives has been imposed by birth...our parents, our home, our nationality, our build, the color of our skin, our culture.”¹⁷ Though Mr. Badii has no personal

complaint, the thick presence of militia, the oppressive evidence of poverty, and the dust of industrialization visible in the urban perimeter through which he drives suggests choking. His suicide is thus readable as an attempt to escape the suffocation brought on by a world where one's identity is laid down by authorities who leave no room for freedom. And yet this sociological reading – of the film and Kiarostami's statement about the film – can only be experienced as insufficient insofar as it neglects the "absolute" dimension to which the film bears witness. What Mr. Badii cannot abide is being stuck to the opaque *desir* of his ancestors. He seeks through suicide not just the actual restrictions his culture imposes, but the restrictive space in which he finds himself bound to its unreadable imperative.

The Affective Tonality of Capitalism

In his seminar on anxiety Lacan protests against the time-honored distinction between fear and anxiety which maintains that anxiety is without object as opposed to fear, which is always transitive. He insists instead that anxiety is "not without object." This is a restatement not a denial of the distinction of the original distinction, for Lacan does not negate the negation of anxiety's object, he qualifies it. Replacing the absolute negation, "without object," with a conditional negation, he makes anxiety a matter of what does not now or not yet objectively exist. This qualification brings Lacan closer to Kierkegaard's "condition which is not" and acknowledges that if anxiety has no actual or realized object, it is nevertheless not pure delusion either. What grips us in anxiety is not nothing, even if it has no objective existence.

I have lingered so long on anxiety because our primary topic, shame, is almost incomprehensible if we do not start out from a consideration of it. What is fundamental to both affects is this non-actualized, unassumable object which sticks to us like a semi-autonomous shadow. In his early work, *On Escape*, Emmanuel Levinas in fact scarcely distinguishes between these affects except to characterize shame as the dashed hope of escape from the alien object that uproots us in anxiety. Like others, including Freud and Lacan, Levinas characterizes anxiety as a kind of state of emergency, the experience of a signal or imperative to Flee! Escape! In his account, however, it is only when the hiccup of hope sustained by this imperative

bursts that we finally enter into shame. With shame I am forced to accept that I am that, that object which sticks to me, even though I do not know what that is and cannot figure out how to integrate it. My question is this: is it hope really hope which is dissipated in shame or is rather the imperative to escape? And if it is the imperative, what becomes of it?

In Levinas the imperative experience of anxiety is thought only as one that compels escape *from* the unintegratable object. We would ask, however: into what can we escape? Anxiety is rarely experienced in the raw; something like the “stem cell” of affects, it is more often encountered in another form, in one of the “social affects” of guilt or shame, which we can describe as two socially differentiated forms of anxiety accompanying two different organizations of our relation to our potentiality and to our past. In brief, anxiety can best be understood as the imperative to (escape into) sociality. Unable to discern our own desire, to know who we are, we feel compelled to flee into sociality in an attempt to find there some image of ourselves. The society of others serves a civilizing function not, as is usually said, because it tames primitive animal instincts, but because it colonizes our savage, inhuman jouissance by allowing us to acquire some self-image.

Now, it is against this backdrop that we will approach the “shame sequence” in *The Wind Will Carry Us*. The problem I have with Dabashi’s reading has nothing to do with the revulsion it expresses toward Behzad, whose actions are inexcusable. As he hangs around Siah-Darreh waiting for Mrs. Malek to die, he occupies himself not only by bothering Zeynab, but also by trying to take photographs of villagers who do not want their pictures taken. The film indicts him for his rudeness and indiscretion, but in what precisely do these crimes consist? If every subject needs to escape anxiety in order to find out who he is, to appear on the public stage whence he can return to himself some self-image, why is Behzad’s attempt to offer the villagers photographic images of themselves counted as an act of rudeness or malice, rather than an act of kindness? One of the villagers in *Life and Nothing More* answer this question when he complains to Farhad, the film director in that film, that the images of the villagers his camera captures make them appear worse than they are.

In what way can images make us appear worse than we are? Behzad and Farhad

both travel to the villages to document what is there to be seen, ultimately in order to archive phenomena on the verge of disappearing. Their mission is to capture a world in the midst of fading, people about to die or presumed lost, ritual practices on the edge of extinction. This archival ambition licenses their rudeness, justifies in their minds their indiscreet attempts to find out what the villagers prefer not to disclose. The *fundamental* problem, however – which is nevertheless related to the conviction that all phenomena are merely transitory – is that these nose-y archivists believe that what is being hidden from them is something which discloses itself to those who try to hide it. In other words, what the diegetic directors disregard while making their images is the very *jouissance* or unrealized surplus of self which makes each villager opaque to herself. The directors rob them of that and thus reduce them to disappearing phenomena.

If we admit that Behzad behaves, as Dabashi believes, in an obscene fashion, we must be prepared to say in what this obscenity consists. The same goes for the charge as it is leveled against the Abu Ghraib photographs. It is often said that the photographs invaded the prisoners' privacy, exposed it to the eyes of the world. But this claim does not go far enough. The obscenity of the Abu Ghraib photographs as with those taken by Behzad consist in their implicit assumption that there is no obscene, no off-screen, that cannot be exposed to a persistent, prying look. The two sets of photographs result from the same obscene denial: they deny that the prisoners and the villagers *are* exposed to their own otherness to themselves. This otherness to ourselves is what constitutes the only interiority we have, it is our privacy. Thus the ultimate crime of the photographers is to proceed as if the prisoners and villagers have no privacy to invade.

At the close of the twentieth century, Nietzsche expressed his scorn for his contemporaries' stupid insistence on trying to "see *through* everything." He protested the lack of reverence and discretion which fueled their tactless attempt so "touch, lick, and finger everything."¹⁸ The phenomenon Nietzsche decried is the frenzied desire we still see all around us, the desire to cast aside every veil, penetrate every surface, transgress every barrier in order to get our hands on the real thing lying behind it. We seem to have installed in the modern world a new "beyondness," a new untouchable, or a new secularized sacred; one that inspires a

new desire for transgression. This secularized sacred does not originate in a belief in the existence of another world, but from the belief that what we want in this world always lies behind a barrier which prevents our access to it.

The rough desire to brush aside barriers and veils arises through a specific structuring of our relation to our culture which we can call guilt. Common to the affects of anxiety, guilt, and shame is our sense of an inalienable and yet unintegratable surplus of self. In guilt this surplus no longer weighs on us as the burden of an unfinished past, but as the unfinished business of the present. The sentiment of our opacity to ourselves is disavowed and in its place arises the sentiment of being excluded from ourselves by exterior barriers. In short, we treat ourselves with the same measure of obscenity as we treat others, denying ourselves any privacy in the true sense. The mechanisms of this conversion of anxiety into guilt are the social and ego ideals which relieve us of the responsibility of having to invent a future without the aid of rules or scripts. Ideals give our actions directions, goals to strive for, and thus alleviate the overwhelming sentiment of anxiety. But because ideals are unattainable, by definition, the (bitter) taste of the absolute is still discernible in them through the experience of the elusive beyond they bring into existence.

The Kurdish villagers are not only submitted to Behzad's indiscretions but also to their own obscene desire to expose another layer of themselves, to cut deeper into their own skin in order to obtain the kind of recognition for which they have begun to thirst. Siah-Darreh seems poised to participate not only in capitalist development, but also to develop a new relation to their cultural past. The unbearable question of who we are was no sooner raised by modernity than resolved by capitalism as a matter no longer of being, but of possessing an identity. Like all possessions, identity turned out to be susceptible to measurement. One could have more or less or it, better or worse forms of it, but one cannot fully acquire it. Around this insufficiency a traffic in identity grows up and the value of modesty recedes drastically.

Exposure

It is the expansion of capitalism and the prevalence of the structure of guilt

supporting it which has made the all-but-extinct affect of shame seem primitive. It is also responsible for making the Islamic system of modesty, with its volatile disdain for the modern, capitalist passion for exposing everything, seem anachronistic, as it did to the author of *The Arab Mind* and it does to Behzad. Thus we return to the sequence in which he attempts to penetrate the darkness of the improbable grotto where Zeynab spends her days. My reading will focus not on the shamelessness of Behzad (which stoops to its depths here), but on the awakening of shame in Zeynab.

As Behzad crosses the threshold of this dark place, the screen goes completely black for several seconds. A long, dark corridor lodges itself between the sunny exterior where a young, unveiled girl plays and the inside. As we watch the empty screen we are given ample time to experience the darkness in which Zeynab will be found. Like a prosecutor who counts out for the jury the seconds – “one one-thousand, two one-thousand, three...” – it took to strangle the victim, Kiarostami holds on the black screen for an uncomfortably long time. Meanwhile, the voice of Behzad inquires, “Is there anyone here?” This is a profound question answerable in the negative. There is no one here, no “I,” only the milking of a cow, the action Zeynab is performing, substantivized, lacking a subject.

Surely one of the most famous scenes of shame is the one presented in *Being and Nothingness* where a voyeur is startled while peering through a keyhole by the sound of rustling leaves. Sartre makes the point that it is only at this moment when the voyeur feels himself being observed by another that he acquires the sentiment of self. Sartre insists also on a point Sedgwick later emphasizes in her discussion of shame: the gaze of the Other does not judge, condemn, or prohibit; the voyeur is *not* made to feel shame *for* himself nor *for* his act of lascivious looking. The gaze functions, rather, as an “indispensable mediator” between the voyeur and himself, the condition necessary for precipitating him out as subject from the act of looking in which he has until this point been totally absorbed.¹⁹ Without this intervention there would be no subject, only peering through a keyhole. The meeting between Behzad and Zeynab invites us to reconsider Sartre’s point in the fullness of its political implications. Zeynab requires an intervention, the presence of others as such, in order to emerge from the milking, from the gerundive form

of her impoverished existence, as a subject. In the absence of this intervention she remains something less than that.

In the standard reading, Sartre's shame scenario is made to seem a bathetic drama in which a supposedly abstract and sovereign act of looking is forced to confront its anchorage in the vulnerability of its bodily foundations. The rustling of leaves functions as a kind of index finger that picks out the voyeur, rendering him painfully conspicuous, a body too much, in a scene where he thought himself bodiless and unobserved, a spectral spectating instance. The emperor of seeing is abruptly laid bare. If this reading of the shame scenario is so unshakeable it is because it captures the squirminess of shame, the feeling that something of ourselves which "ought to have remained hidden" is suddenly exposed, and exposed as belonging to us *undeniably*. And yet however vividly the exposure of one's nakedness, of one's body, evokes the feeling of shame (the sight of the cow's udders as they are being milked by Zeynab is meant of course to evoke this uncomfortable feeling in the film sequence), shame is obviously not reducible to an experience of being seen without one's clothes, of being seen literally naked. Nor is it an experience of being anchored to the dead weight of one's own body, to one's body as object. In shame one finds oneself attached inescapably to the nonobjectifiable object of one's own *jouissance* and thus to one's lived body. What is it then that distinguishes the feeling of anxiety from the feeling of shame, given that they can both be described as the sentiment of being riveted to this same unintegratable excess? The difference lies not, as Levinas would have it, in the vanishing of all hope of escape but, rather, in the vanishing of the imperative to escape. That imperative is replaced by another: to hide, conceal, or refuse to disclose in order to protect and preserve that inalienable and yet unassumable excess which designates me rigidly, that is, in my uniqueness.

There is no denying that shame is not only an experience that transgresses the pleasure principle, but often one of excruciating pain. The same can be said of anxiety. With anxiety, however, our own self-distance and self-opacity are sources of pain insofar as they threaten to annihilate us totally, while with shame the threat is aimed at this opacity whose exposure would, annihilate us. We therefore seek to preserve this opacity at all costs, even though its presence brings its own pain.

What accounts for this alteration in our relation to the troubling excess that distances us from ourselves? We described anxiety as the sentiment of a negative capacity to not be which we flee by choosing social existence, where we appear not only to others but also to ourselves. A problem arises, however, if the realm of social appearance seems to offer a poor reflection of who we are, if in gaining an appearance we seem to lose ourselves. When among all the images of myself and others, I remain absent; when the cost of appearing in the world is the loss of my own gaze, of the “I” who sees myself in my public image, then that passion we earlier associated with guilt is aroused: to break through the façade of appearances.

The sentiment of shame is occasioned, on the contrary, when in the exterior space of social existence, of public appearance, I suddenly appear *in the flesh*. I see not only the public images I ordinarily see, but alongside them, as if momentarily granted a slightly wider peripheral vision, the red patch of my own cheeks. I appear there in the flesh alongside – at a slight distance from – my own image as the gaze with which I look at the world appears in the world, gazes at me and locates me there at a remove from myself. *This* is the radical point: the gaze under which I feel myself observed in shame is my *own* gaze. Lost in guilt, it is found in shame, in the space of publicity.

Now, since this gaze is not an object in the ordinary sense, is not an eye but the jouissance of the eye, the very potentiality of sight, it cannot and does not appear as an object. Yet that which, strictly speaking, cannot be seen, can and does appear or assume a sensible presence in the movement by which “all the perspectives, the lines of force, of my world” begin to shift in relation to the felt presence of my gaze.²⁰ My gaze appears in the world as a shape-changer, as the shapeability of the forms of social existence, which I – through my jouissance, my potentiality – have the capacity to transform.

Here we must recall the paradox of shame whose explanation holds the key to understanding this affect. Shame is a feeling of one’s isolation or uniqueness at the same time as it is an intensely social feeling. While shame delivers an experience of our interiority, of a reserve of potentiality or jouissance which sets us apart from all others, it at the same time makes this interiority appear outside us, in the midst of the world. Our interiority is thus exposed as an event in the world; it is revealed as

an exposure to others. This is another way of saying, in part, that our own jouissance or potentiality is not felt to be at the disposal of our will, that it does not disclose to us its secrets. But nor do we have, in shame, the urge to disclose these secrets. Though it is often said that shame paralyzes desire, it is not usually specified which desire is targeted. Our argument makes clear that shame puts an end to the desire to turn our jouissance into a weapon we can possess and wield against the social order. Shame seeks rather to preserve the secrets of jouissance's complicity with others, with the unknowable desire of our ancestors, in order then to realize that jouissance on behalf of the society of others among whom we dwell.

In Dabashi's reading of the encounter between Behzad and Zeynab, it is Behzad who brings shame to Zeynab. This misreading depends on the reduction of shame to the product of a simple intersubjective relation in which the belittling or degrading look of another person is sufficient to ignite shame. I would argue, however, that it is not Behzad who occasions shame in Zeynab, but the erotic poem by Forough Farrokhzad, "The Wind Will Carry Us," which Behzad recites to Zeynab in his clumsy attempt to seduce her. Forough's words have an effect on Zeynab unintended by Behzad and it is they, not the lamp he tries to shine on her, which pluck her out of the darkness, set her apart from the act of milking that absorbs her. She is visibly fascinated and surprised by the poem. As Behzad tries to manipulate the situation by drawing some purely external connections between Forough and this unlettered village girl, the poem in fact gives Zeynab not a borrowed identity but a sentiment of self. That is, Zeynab does not identify with Forough, as Behzad invites her to, but experiences on hearing it the sentiment of self, precisely: the sentiment of shame that allows her to experience the relatedness of her own intimacy to the fate of others.

Sunk in darkness, Zeynab remains invisible not only to others, but also to her self. She does not exist merely for herself but for nobody. In order to experience herself as a subject, she requires an outer dimension, a visibility outside herself. The poem, a significant article of her own culture, gives Zeynab access to that outer dimension. We often hear it said that modesty is a cultural phenomenon; one can only feel naked, they say, under our clothes. But what is usually meant by this is that culture inhibits us sexually, makes us self-conscious of our nakedness. Forough's

erotic poem can by no stretch of the imagination be conceived as censorious of sexuality, nor does it make Zeynab feel self-conscious before Behzad, quite the opposite. If modesty is, in fact, a product of culture (and Zeynab's modesty a product of the poem), it is because shame makes visible the impossibility of self-consciousness. It exposes the unobjectifiable object which decenters me from myself; but it exposes it as sandwiched between, or framed by, the forms of my culture. The framing of the object in shame can thus be thought as a taming of the violence that ravishes me in anxiety. The gaze imagined by Zeynab on hearing Forough's words sees nothing, or sees the nothing-to-see, that which has no likeness, no image, because it has no like.

We are now prepared to confront directly the thesis put forward in the book, *The Arab Mind*, namely that the Islamic system of modesty makes Muslim people susceptible to shame. To the extent that the *hejab* system encourages subjects to experience their interiority, their privacy, as being in tact even while they are in a public place, as many Muslims attest, then it certainly safeguards shame in the sense we have spoken of it here – but definitely not in the sense implied by that book. To the extent, however, that the *hejab* system forbids or impedes any of its citizens access to publicity, it strips them of the possibility of experiencing shame. Under these conditions no architectural barrier, no veil, or chador will suffice to protect a citizens' modesty. Rather than protecting women from exposure, the limitation of their access to public forums can only turn them inside out, externalize them completely. .

Perhaps it is the image of Behzad running around throughout the film trying to pick up a clearer signal for his cell phone that calls to my mind the debates over wire tapping in the U.S. In these debates privacy became an issue because telephone conversations necessarily traversed public space and thus problematized the relation between the public and the private. During these debates the Supreme Court entertained the argument that privacy could not be localized in a delimitable *space* that might then be ruled out of the reach of the State. Privacy is attached to the *subject* and is inviolable no matter where a citizen may be, in public or private space. But if the subject's sentiment of self, her feeling of shame, intimacy, privacy depends fundamentally on her relations with others as such, her freedom to engage

in society cannot be curtailed without damage to her privacy.







The question Kiarostami's reserved cinema raises is this: how can there be any modesty, any shame, for women such as Zeynab if they are prohibited by custom, costume, or legal restrictions from appearing, from entering public space and engaging in the relations they choose? The system of modesty, I began by saying, obliged all Iranian filmmakers to limit themselves to exterior spaces. What makes the cinema of Kiarostami uniquely interesting is the way he introduces interiority, privacy, into this all-exterior world, into the public spaces he almost exclusively films.

This essay is dedicated to the memory of Toshikatsu Murayama.

- 1 The regulations aimed at "Islamicizing" Iranian cinema were ratified and the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance instituted in February 1983. Hamid Naficy provides the most comprehensive and cogent analysis of the impact of these regulations on Iranian films. See, in particular, his "Veiled vision/powerful presences: women in post-revolutionary Iranian cinema," in *Life and Art: The New Iranian Cinema*, ed. Rose Issa and Sheila Whitaker (London: NFT and BFI, 1999).
- 2 The source of my information about the relation between Raphael Patai's *The Arab Mind* and the strategy of "shaming" adopted by the U.S. at Abu Ghraib is Seymour M. Hersh, "The Gray Zone: How a Secret Government Program Came to Abu Ghraib," *The New Yorker*, May 24, 2004.
- 3 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, *Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003). See also, Lisa Cartwright and David Benin, "Shame, Empathy, and Looking Practices: Lessons from a Disability Studies Classroom," in *Journal of Visual Culture*, vol. 5, no. 2 (2006) for an interesting use of the work of Sedgwick and Silvan Tomkins.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p. 41.
- 5 *Ibid.*, p. 37; on this paradox, see also Stanley Cavell, *Must We Mean What We say?* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1976): "Shames is the most isolating of feelings but also the most primitive of social responses...simultaneously the discovery of the isolation of the individual, his presence to himself, but also to others," p. 286.
- 6 Giorgio Agamben, *Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (New York: Zone Books, 1999), p. 110; p. 107.
- 7 Sedgwick, p. 37.
- 8 *Ibid.*

- 9 Hamid Dabashi's otherwise highly informative *Close-Up: Iranian Cinema, Past, Present and Future* (London and New York: Verso, 2001) explodes into an unfair (to my mind) rant against *The Wind Will Carry Us* in its final chapter, pp. 251-259.
- 10 Emmanuel Levinas, *On Escape*, trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 52. See my "May '68, The Emotional Month," in *Lacan: The Silent Partners*, ed. Slavoj Žižek (London and New York: Verso Press, 2006) for further discussion of Levinas and shame.
- 11 My implication is that we should look also to Islamic philosophy for a theory of the "unfinished past." See, for example, Henry Corbin's "Prologue" to his study of Islamic philosophy in *Spiritual Body and Celestial Earth: From Mazdean Iran to Shi'ite Iran*, trans. Nancy Pearson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977): "Our authors suggest that if our past were really what we believe it to be, that is, completed and closed, it would not be the grounds for such vehement discussions. They suggest that all our *acts of understanding* are so many recommencements, *re-iterations* of events still unconcluded," p. xxix.
- 12 Søren Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on the Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 155.
- 13 Jacques Lacan, *Le séminaire: livre VIII: Le transfert*, text established by Jacques-Alain Miller (Paris, Seuil, 1991), p. 155.
- 14 Sigmund Freud, "Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety," *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, trans. James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1959), vol. XX: "Analysis shows that when activities like...writing...are subjected to neurotic inhibitions it is because... the fingers...have become too strongly eroticized. It has been discovered as a general fact that the ego-function of an organ is impaired if its erotogenicity – its sexual significance – is increased. It behaves, if I may be allowed a rather absurd analogy, like a maid-servant who refuses to go on cooking because her master has started a love-affair with her," pp. 89-90. Note that it is the "ego-function" which is impaired; the eroticized fingers, in becoming eroticized, are endowed with pure potentiality.
- 15 See, especially, Giorgio Agamben, "Bartleby, or On Contingency," in *Potentialities*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 243-271. Interestingly, Agamben's essay makes note of the important contribution of Islamic philosophers to the concept of potentiality.
- 16 "Taste of Kiarostami," David Sterritt in interview with Abbas Kiarostami, <http://senseofcinema.com/contents/00/9kiarostami.html>.
- 17 Abbas Kiarostami, "Une approche existentialiste de la vie," interview with Michel Ciment and Stéphane Goudet, published in *Positif*, no. 442 (December 1997), p. 85 and cited in Stéphane Goudet, "Le Gout de la cerise...et las saveur de la mure," *L'Avant Scene*, no. 471 (April 1998), p. 1.

- 18 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1965), p. 263, p. 213.
- 19 Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1956), p. 369.
- 20 Jacques Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, trans. Alain Sheridan (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1977), p. 84.



Studio Art Magazine
4 Ahuzat Bayit St.
POB 29772, Tel Aviv 61290
ISRAEL

Tel: 972-3-5165274
www.studiomagazine.co.il
studio1@netvision.net.il

סטודיו
רחוב אחוזות בית 4
ת.ד. 29772, תל-אביב 61290

